# 1nc

### K – Link

#### The affirmative radically depoliticizes the economy - this can never obtain the dimensions of universality because it precludes acts of authentic politics

**Zizek, ’99** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

**The big news of today’s post-political age** of the ‘end of ideology’ **is** thus **the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy:** the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, **as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of** religious, sexual, ethnic and other **way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made.** In short, **the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom,** the subordinated of the process of production to social control – **the radical** repoliticization of the economy.That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s **post-politics cannot attain** the properly political dimension of **universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization.** The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: **all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues** (gay rights, **ecology,** ethnic minorities…), **all this incessant activity** of fluid, shifting identities, **of building multiple** ad hoc **coalitions,** and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and **ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what** really matters **– will** not **be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized.** 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, **it is much more crucial to focus on what** remains the same **in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital.** The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### Identity politics makes the realization of a true universal impossible

**Zizek, ’09** (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, professor at the European Graduate School, and total BAMF, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, p. 102, bgm)

Liberals who acknowledge the problems of those excluded from the socio-political process formulate their goal as being the inclusion of those whose voices are not heard: all positions should be listened to, all interests taken into account, the human rights of everyone guaranteed, all ways of life, cultures, and practices respected, and so on. The obsession of this democratic discourse is the protection of all kinds of minorities: cultural, religious, sexual, *e tutti quanti*. The formula of democracy is patient negotiation and compromise. What gets lost here is the proletarian position, the position of universality embodied in the Excluded. This is why, upon a closer look, it becomes clear that what Hugo Chavez has begun doing in Venezuela differs markedly from the standard liberal form of inclusion: Chavez is not including the “excluded” dwellers of favelas as his *base* and then reorganizing political space and political forms so that the latter will “fit” the excluded. Pedantic and abstract as it may appear, this difference—between “bourgeois democracy” and “dictatorship of the proletariat” —is crucial.

#### The affirmative cedes the universal

Perm links to our ethics disad and get’s co-opted – cedes the universal

The plan’s political interpassivity --- all their cede the political args link harder to them --- they’re not about political change, the purpose of the aff is to provide ample energy supplies so that underlying economic structures don’t have to be changed

**Valentić 07** (Tonči, University of Zagreb, “Socialism reconsidered: Remarks on Žižek`s *Repeating Lenin”,* International Journal of Zizek Studies, <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/47/92>)

Žižek`s assertion that the main failure of today's Left is the acceptance of the cultural wars (such as anti-racist or feminist) as the dominant terrain of the emancipatory politics is very easy to defend. There are basically two possible ways for the socio-political engagement: either to play the game of the system, i.e. to engage in the "long march through the institutions" or to get active in new social movements(such as feminism, ecology, antiracism, minority rights, etc.). Žižek rejects both of them, being mainly negative towards the second since they are not political in a strict sense of the word: they are not more that "single issue movements" with the lack of social totality, focused only on one group of people or one single social issue, thus rejecting the universalism as an important part of any struggle in the public sphere. Instead of a "right to narrate" one personal story or story from one particular point of viewof the so-called socially deprived groups, he emphasizes the "right to truth" as embodied in historical figure of St. Paul, calling on the traces of Alain Badiou for humanity beyond particular disintegration or abstract humanism, beyond pathetic brotherhood, instead based on the "politics of truth". He puts into play the role of Saint Paul because in the realm of political theology he aimed to ground a new collective that abandons and leaves behind both the "Roman" and "Jewish" way, i.e. false universalism of liberal democracy's discourse and orthodox right-wing fundamentalism. With his assertion of today's world seen as period of post-modern relativism where we should articulate the universal truth as prerequisite for emancipatory politics, he overwrites the Leninist notion of "politics of truth" claiming it still has to be reinvented and implied. Since Badoiu`s notion of Event tends to "emerge out of nowhere", the same goes for Leninism as radical gesture: it is the only way to cope with contemporary totalitarian liberal democracy, so this reference to Lenin serves as an effort to break the vicious circle of these false options, i.e. either to play the game in hope you can one day beat the system or to fight the system emphasizing social particularities. The statement is very clear and convincing: partial emancipation is possible only through universal emancipation, which means particular experience cannot be universalized and therefore denotes a conservative political gesture, such as an emphasis on minority rights, gay and lesbian organizations, etc. Žižek`s critical remarks on the contemporary dominant fetish of repressed "otherness" as well as a concept of social intolerance towards the Other become the battlefield for analysis of Other's intolerance towards us, which is not politically correct but is politically true. Just as radicalism often represents an empty gesture, by the same token it is also the case with the political correctness as well as fascination with victimized Other, which leads us to the new type of exclusion, the exclusion of those who do not play by those imposed rules and are a priori considered terrorists or oppressors if they belong to the majority group (for example, single white Anglo-American male in today's United States in contrast to black lesbian woman). The important step, or to put it more clearly, the main theoretical act, is precisely to define hegemonic ideological coordinates because if you act you are already in the game, playing by the rules. Regarding political Denkverbot mentioned before, Žižek humorously but nonetheless punctually paraphrases Max Horkheimer`s sentence "those who do not want to talk about fascism, should keep silent about capitalism" into "those who do not want to talk about global capitalism, should keep silent about socialism". Political activity is here accurately seen as an example of political interpassivity, i.e. doing things not to achieve something, but to prevent something from really changing, as in an unmentioned reference to famous Visconti`s phrase in one of his movies that "everything has to be changed in order to remain the same". The Return to Lenin has a quite different aim. Instead of playing the role of leftist intellectual who pretends to be critical towards capitalism discussing the transition from commodity fetishism to fetishism which is today itself commodified or to support the naïve belief in cyber communism as the possible way of resistance, he calls for repetition of Lenin's historical gesture with the famous question, once more brought into the intellectual debate: "Čto djelat?" or "What Is To Be Done?" Here it is crucial to emphasize the relevance of so called "high theory" today for the most concrete political struggle – as we remember from socialism, theoretical knowledge is not unimportant; quite contrary, as Žižek argues, it is the main incentive for the revolutionary act which follows it. Another author who uses Lenin as a crucial figure is Toni Negri (article "What to do with "What to do?" Or rather: The body of General Intellect"), who grippingly emphasized the biopolitical aspect of Leninism, (Lenin beyond Lenin), i.e. interpreting communist struggle as inevitably biopolitical struggle. Since the present ideologico-political constellation is characterized by the tendency to introduce moralistic reasoning into the political struggle, we are only a few steps away from a teleological explanation of liberal-democratic capitalism as the ultimate and eternal social order. The true problem with the democracy as *liberal* democracy is in its inherent paradox, since it is possible only in the conditions of its impossibility, and the major problem with the state from the socialist point of view is that it has always been seen as an instrument of oppression which can never be fully democratized. For that reason, socialist interventions pinpoint the dominant role of the state as well as democracy's insufficiencies.

#### Focusing on the positionality of race papers over capitalism

**hooks 2K** (bell, prof of English city college, where we stand: class matters page 5-6)

Racial solidarity, particularly the solidarity of whiteness, has historically always been used to obscure class, to make the white poor see their interests as one with the world of white privilege. Similarly, the black poor have always been told that class can never matter as much as race. Nowadays the black and white poor know better. They are not so easily duped by an appeal to unquestioned racial identification and solidarity, but they are still uncertain about what all the changes mean; they are uncertain about where they stand. This uncertainty is shared by those who are not poor, but who could be poor tomorrow if jobs are lost. They, too, are afraid to say how much class matters. While the poor are offered addiction as a way to escape thinking too much, working people are encouraged to shop. Consumer culture silences working people and the middle classes. They are busy buying or planning to buy. Although their frag-ile hold on economic self-sufficiency is slipping, they still cling to the dream of a class-free society where everyone can make it to the top. They are afraid to face the significance of dwindling resources, the high cost of education, housing, and health care. They are afraid to think too deeply about class.

#### The affirmative’s construction of “blackness” as a legitimate way to frame social relations de-politicizes the capitalist underbelly of American Pedagogy. Their 1AC serves to make exclusion inevitable by upholding race as an analytic category while attempting to deconstruct social relations of difference.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

**There has been a tendency in postmodern and post-structuralist views of the anti-racism project and “race relations” to neglect or ignore profound changes in the structural nature and dynamics of U.S. capitalism, in** place of obvious or common sense appraisals of **racialized inequality.** This same tendency is also evident in much of the recent scholarship on cultural politics and social difference. **At a time when** a historical materialist **linguistic** **questions tied to academic achievement. This is illustrated by the large body of education literature that focuses on the cultural difference of “language minority” student, while only marginally discussing the impact of racialized inequality and class position on identity and cultural formations**, **as if somehow the problems of African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and other student from subordinate cultural populations can be resolved simply through the introduction of culturally relevant curriculum** or the enactment of language policy. Moreover, **it is this limited view of the problem that most informs the recent political debates between supporters of bilingual education and California‘s Proposition 227** (also known as the Unz Initiative or English for the Children). As Morrison implies**, unproblematized “common sense” acceptance and use of “race” as a legitimate way to frame social relations has been highly prevalent in the social sciences**. The use of this term, for example, among Chicano scholars in the 1960s can be linked to academic acts of resistance to the term “ethnicity” and theories of assimilation which were generally applied to discuss immigration populations of European decent. In efforts to distance Chicano scholarship from this definition and link it to a theory of internal colonialism, cultural imperialism, and racism, **Chicanos were discussed as a colonized “racial” group in much the same manner that many radical theorists positioned African Americans**. Consequently, **the term’s association with power, resistance, and self-determination has veiled the problematics of “race” as a social construct**. Protected by the force of cultural nationalist rhetoric, **“race” as an analytical term has remained a “paper tiger” – seemingly powerful in discourse matters but ineffectual as an analytical metaphor, incapable of moving us away from the pervasive notion of “race” as an innate determinant of behavior**. **In these times, we would be hard-pressed to find a progressive scholar who would subscribe to the use of “race” as a determinant of specific social phenomena associated with inherent** (on genetic**) characteristics of a group. Yet the use of “race” as an analytical category continues to maintain a stronghold in both academic and popular discourse. What does it mean to** **attribute analytical status to the idea of “race” and use it as an explanatory concept in theoretical discussion? The use of “race” as an analytical category means to position it as a central organizing theoretical principal in deconstructing social relations of difference, as these pertain to subordinate cultural populations**. Notwithstanding provocative arguments by left theorists such as Adolph Reed Jr., who unequivocally assert that “Race is purely a social construction; it has no core reality outside a specific social and historical context…its material force derives from state power, not some ahistorical ‘nature’ of any sort of primordial group affinities,” there is an unwillingness to abandon its use. Yet, **it is this persistent use of “Race” in the literature and research on African Americans, Latinos, and other culturally subordinate populations that perpetuates its definition as a causal factor.** As such**, the notion of “race” as a social construction “only leads us back into the now familiar move of substituting a sociohistorical conception of race for the biological one…that is simple to bury the biological conception below the surface, not to transcend it.” Hence, significance and meaning are still attributed to phenotypical features, rather than to the historically reproduced complex processes of racialization. This ultimately serves to conceal the particular set of social conditions experienced by racialized groups that are determined by an interplay of complex social processes, one of which is premised on the articulation of racism to effect legitimate exclusion. This process** of racialization **is at work in the disturbing “scientific” assertion that “race” determines academic performance** **made by** Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray in their book **The Bell Curve. Their work illustrates the theoretical minefield of perpetuation such an analytical category in the social sciences and the potential negative consequences on racialized groups. The use of the term “race” serves to conceal the truth that is it not “race” that determines academic performance; but rather, that academic performance is determined by an interplay of complex social processes, one of which is premised on the articulation of racism** (and its subsequent practices of racialization) **to affect exclusion in the classroom and beyond**. It is within the historical and contemporary contexts of such scholarship that differences in skin color have been and are signified as a mark which suggests the existence of different “races.” As a consequence, a primary response among many progressive activists and scholars when we call for the elimination of “race” as an analytical category is to reel off accusations of a “color-blind” discourse. This is not what we are arguing. What we do argue is that **the fixation on skin color is not inherent in its existence but is a product of signification. This is to say, human beings identify skin color to mark or symbolize other phenomena** **in a variety of social contexts in which other significations occur. As a consequence when human practices include and exclude people in light of the signification of skin color, collective identities are produced and social inequalities are structured.** Moreover, **it is this employment of the idea of “race” in the structuring of social relations that is termed racialization.** More specifically**, Miles in his book Racism defines this process of racialization as “those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectives…the concept** therefore **refers to a process of categorization, a representational process defining an Other** (usually, but not exclusively) **somatically.**” Hence, **to interpret accurately the conditions faced by subordinate cultural populations requires us to move from the idea of “Race” to an understanding of racialization and its impact on class formations. This summons a bold analytical transition from the language of “race” to recognizing the centrality of racism and the process of racialization in our understanding of exclusionary practices that give rise to structural inequalities.**

#### The affirmatives focus on the concept of “race” in interpreting inequality only serves to reinforce racialized identity politics.

Just like the governments solution to bus “black” and “white” students as a means to improve “race relations,” the affirmative fails to incorporate issues of class, and will ultimately fail. The 1AC accepts the neutrality of the economy and still maintains the dangerous separation of the political and economic spheres of society.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among social science scholars to focus on notions of “race.” Over the last three decades, **there has been an overwhelming tendency among a variety of critical scholars to focus on the concept of “race” as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization.** As a consequence, **much of the literature on subordinate cultural populations, with its emphasis on such issues as “racial inequality**,” “racial **segregation,**” “racial **identity,” has utilized the construct of “race” as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality** and marginalization**. In turn, this literature has reinforced a racialized politics of identity and representation, with its problematic emphasis on “racial” identity as the overwhelming impulse for political action. This theoretical practice has led to serious analytical weaknesses and absence of depth in much of the historical and contemporary writings on racialized populations in this country.** The politics of **busing in the early 1970s provides an excellent example that illustrates this phenomenon. Social scientists studying “race relations” concluded that contact among “Black” and “White” students would improve “race relations”** and the education conditions of “Black” students if they were bused to “White” (better) schools outside their neighborhoods**. Thirty years later, many parents and educators adamantly denounce the busing solution** (a solution based on a discourse of “race”) as not only fundamentally problematic to the fabric of African American and Chicano communities, **but an erroneous social policy experiment that failed to substantially improve that overall academic performance of students in these communities**. Given this legacy, it is not surprising to find that the theories, practices, and policies that have informed social science analysis of racialized populations today are overwhelmingly rooted in a **politics of identity, a approach that is founded on parochial notions of “race” and representation which ignore the imperatives of capitalist accumulation and the existence of class divisions within racialized subordinate populations. The folly of this position** if critiqued by Ellen Meiksins Wood in her article entitled “Identity Crisis,” where she exposes the limitations of **a politics of identity which fails to contend with the fact that capitalism is the most totalizing system of social relations the world has ever known**. Yet**, in much of the work on Native American, Latino, Native American, and Asian populations, an analysis of class and a critique of capitalism is conspicuously absent. And** even **when it is mentioned, the emphasis is primarily on an undifferentiated plurality of identity politics or an “intersection of oppressions,” which**, unfortunately, **ignores the overwhelming tendency of capitalism to homogenize rather than to diversify human experience.** Moreover, **this practice is particularly disturbing since no matter where one travels around the world, there is no question that racism is integral to the process of capital accumulation. For example, the current socioeconomic conditions of Latinos and other racialized populations can be traced to the relentless emergence of the global economy and recent economic policies of expansion, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement** (NAFTA). A recent United Nations report by the International Labor Organization confirms the negative impact of globalization on racialized populations. By the end of 1998, it was projected that one billion workers would be unemployed. The people of Africa, China, and Latin America have been most affected by the current restricting of capitalist development**. This phenomenon of racialized capitalism is directly linked to the abusive practices and destructive impact of the “global factory**” – a global financial enterprise system **that includes such transnational corporations as Coca Cola, Walmart, Disney,** Ford Motor Company, **and General Motors**. In a recent speech on “global economic apartheid,” John Cavanagh, co-executive director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., comments on the practices of the Ford Motor Company. “The Ford Motor Company has its state-of-the-art assembly plant in Mexico…where because it can deny basic worker rights, it can pay one-tenth the wages and yet get the same quality and the same productivity in producing goods….The same technologies by the way which are easing globalization are also primarily cutting more jobs that they’re creating**.” The failure of scholars to confront this dimension in their analysis of contemporary society as a racialized phenomenon and their tendency to continue treating class as merely one of a multiplicity of** (equally valid) **perspectives, which may or may not “intersect” with** the process of **racialization, are serious shortcomings.** In addressing this issue, we must recognize that **identity politics**, which generally **gloss over class differences and**/or **ignore** **class contradictions, have often been used by radical scholars and activists within African American, Latino, and other subordinate cultural communities in an effort to build a political base.** Here, **fabricated constructions of “race” are objectified and mediated as truth to ignite political support, divorced from the realities of class struggle. By so doing, they unwittingly perpetuated the vacuous and dangerous notion that the political and economic are separate spheres of society which can function independently – a view that firmly anchors and sustains prevailing class relations of power in society.** Ramon Grosfoguel and Chloe S. Georas posit that “social identities are constructed and reproduced in complex and entangled political, economic, and symbolic hierarchy.” Given this complex entanglement, **what is needed is a more dynamic and fluid notion of how we think about different cultural identities within the context of contemporary capitalist social formations. Such a perspective of identity would support our efforts to shatter static and frozen notions that perpetuate ahistorical, apolitical, and classless view of culturally pluralistic societies.** How we analytically accomplish this is no easy matter. But however this task is approached, we must keep in mind Wood’s concern: **“We should not confuse respect for the plurality of human experience and social struggles with a complete dissolution of historical causality, where there is nothing but diversity, difference and contingency, no unifying structures, no logic of process, no capitalism and therefore no negation of it, no universal project of human emancipation.”** Hence, **if we are to effectively challenge the horrendous economic impacts of globalization on racialized communities, we must recognize that a politics of identity is** grossly inept and **unsuited for building and sustaining collective political movements for social justice** and economic democracy. Instead, **what we need is to fundamentally reframe the very terrain that gives life to our political movements** for social justice and economic democracy. Instead, what we need is to fundamentally reframe the very terrain that gives life to our political understanding of what it means to live, work, and struggle in a society with widening class differentiation and ever-increasing racialized inequality**. Through** such **an analytical process of reframing, we can expand the terms by which identities are** considered, examined, and **defined, recognizing racialized relations of power are fundamentally shaped by the profound organizational and spatial transformations of the capitalist economy.**

### Priortization

#### Capitalism is the starting point for all other political considerations – class struggle is the universal antagonism that creates space for particular struggles like feminism and anti-racism. A political strategy that does not address capital will ensure that larger structures of oppression remain intact.

**McLaren 06** (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, <http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm>, jj)

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series *that sustains the horizon of the series itself*. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (*Totalitarianism* 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the *fantasy* of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its *reality*. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without *revolution*; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

#### Class must be recognized as qualitatively the most important oppression—otherwise the system is able to satisfy demands on grounds of formal equality, destroying attempts to overcome capitalist oppression.

**Giminez, ’01** [Martha, Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: <http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html>]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. **This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory**, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). **Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it.** Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). **Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators** (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). **Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher** (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, **class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression**. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. **The working class**, on the other hand**, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital** and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). **While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged**. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. **The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth**, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. **In so far as** the **"class"** in RGC **remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.** Nevertheless, **I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument** not only **on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change** but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that **some power relations are more important and consequential than others**. **For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former**. In my view, **the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations.** In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression**, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination**. **Class relations** -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- **are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them.** **Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers.** **Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances.** **To argue**, then, **that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.**

### K – Impact

#### The system of Capital make social exclusion on a global scale inevitable – the utmost ethico-political responsibility is to reject this system of economic evaluation.

**Zizek and Daly 4** (Slavoj, professor of philosophy at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, and Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, Conversations with Zizek, page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### It is not possible to solve any situation without solving them all - only a criticism which attacks the universality of capitalism can solve their impacts and the inevitable destruction of the Earth and its people

**Zizek, ’89**

(Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, The Sublime Object of Ideology, page 3-4)

It is upon the unity of these two features that the Marxist notion of the revolution, of the revolutionary situation, is founded: **a situation of metaphorical condensation in which it finally becomes clear to the everyday consciousness that it is not possible to solve any particular ques­tion without** solving them all - that is, **without solving the fundamental question which embodies the antagonistic character of the social totality. In a 'normal', pre-revolutionary state of things, everybody is fighting his own particular battles** (workers are striking for better wages, feminists are fighting for the rights of women, democrats for political and social freedoms, ecologists against the exploitation of nature, participants in the peace movements against the danger of war, and so on). Marxists are using all their skill and adroimess of argument to convince the partici­pants in these particular struggles that the only real solution to their problem is to be found in the global revolution: **as long as social relations are dominated by Capital, there will always be sexism in relations between the sexes, there will always be a threat of global war, there will always be a danger that political and social freedoms will be suspended, nature itself will always remain an object of ruthless exploitation**. . . . **The global revolution will then abolish the basic social antagonism, enabling the formation of a transparent, rationally governed society.**

#### Modern Racism is no longer based on ideologies of cultural or natural superiority - economic egotism is the root of modern racism

**Zizek 2008** Slavoj Violence p 101-104

But we are not dealing here only with good old racism. Something more is at stake: a fundamental feature of our emerging “global” society. On ii September 2001 the Twin Towers were hit. Twelve years earlier, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. That date heralded the “happy ‘9os,” the Francis Fukuyama dream of the “end of history” —the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won; that the search was over; that the advent of a global, liberal world community lurked just around the corner; that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time was up). In contrast, 9/11 is the main symbol of the end of the Clintonite happy ‘9os. This is the era in which new walls emerge everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, on the U.S.—Mexico border. The rise of the populist New Right is just the most prominent example of the urge to raise new walls. A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the European Union passed almost unnoticed: the plan to establish an all-European border police force to secure the isolation of Union territory and thus to prevent the influx of immigrants. *This* is the truth of globalisation: the construction of new walls safeguarding prosperous Europe from the immigrant flood. One is tempted to resuscitate here the old Marxist “humanist” opposition of “relations between things” and “relations between persons”: in the much-celebrated free circulation opened up by global capitalism, it is “things” (commodities) which freely circulate, while the circulation of “persons” is more and more controlled. We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an unfinished project but with a true “dialectics of globalisation”: the segregation of the people *is* the reality of economic globalisation. This new racism of the developed is in a way much more brutal than the previous ones: its implicit legitimisation is neither naturalist (the “natural” superiority of the developed West) nor any longer culturalist (we in the West also want to preserve our cultural identity), but unabashed economic egotism. The fundamental divide is one between those included in the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it.

#### Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations-capitalism racializes subjects to entrench competition and destroy universal consciousness as well as sustains white racism as a method of papering over contradictions. All of this is used to maintain the system of capital accumulation

E. San **Juan**, 20**03**, “Marxism and the Race/Class Problematic: A Re-Articulation,” <http://clogic.eserver.org/2003/sanjuan.html>

It seems obvious that **racism cannot be dissolved by instances of status mobility** when sociohistorical circumstances change gradually or are transformed by unforeseen interventions. **The black bourgeoisie continues to be harassed and stigmatized by liberal or multiculturalist practices of racism**, not because they drive Porsches or conspicuously flaunt all the indices of wealth. **Class exploitation** cannot replace or stand for racism because it is the condition of possibility for it. It **is what enables the racializing of selected markers, whether physiological or cultural, to maintain, deepen and reinforce alienation, mystifying reality by modes of commodification, fetishism, and reification characterizing the routine of quotidian life. Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation and domination.** ***Reconstructing Historical Materialism*** 30. We might take a passage from Marx as a source of guidelines for developing a historical-materialist theory of racism which is not empiricist but dialectical in aiming for theorizing conceptual concreteness as a multiplicity of historically informed and configured determinations. This passage comes from a letter dated 9 April 1870 to Meyer and Vogt in which Marx explains why the Irish struggle for autonomy was of crucial significance for the British proletariat: . . . Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class *divided* into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. **The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the *ruling* nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country *against Ireland*, thus strengthening their domination *over himself***. **He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the '~~niggers~~' in the former slave states of the USA**. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the *English rule in Ireland*. **This antagonism is artificially kept alive** and intensified **by** the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of **the ruling classes**. This *antagonism* is the *secret of the impotence of the English working class*, despite its organization. **It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power**. And that class is fully aware of it (quoted in Callinicos 1993). Here Marx sketches three parameters for the sustained viability of racism in modern capitalist society. First, the economic competition among workers is dictated by the distribution of labor power in the labor-market via differential wage rates. The distinction between skilled and unskilled labor is contextualized in differing national origins, languages and traditions of workers, which can be manipulated into racial antagonisms. Second, the appeal of racist ideology to white workers, with their identification as members of the "ruling nation" affording--in W.E.B. DuBois's words--"public and psychological wage" or compensation. Like religion, **white-supremacist nationalism provides the illusory resolution to the real contradictions of life for the working majority of citizens.** Third, **the ruling class reinforces and maintains these racial divisions for the sake of capital accumulation** within the framework of its ideological/political hegemony in the metropolis and worldwide. 31. **Racism and nationalism are thus modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history**. No doubt social conflicts in recent times have involved not only classes but also national, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as feminist, ecological, antinuclear social movements (Bottomore 1983). The concept of "internal colonialism" (popular in the seventies) that subjugates national minorities, as well as the principle of self-determination for oppressed or "submerged" nations espoused by Lenin, exemplify dialectical attempts to historicize the collective agency for socialist transformation. Within the framework of the global division of labor between metropolitan center and colonized periphery, a Marxist program of national liberation is meant to take into account the extraction of surplus value from colonized peoples through unequal exchange as well as through direct colonial exploitation in "Free Trade Zones," illegal traffic in prostitution, mail-order brides, and contractual domestics (at present, the Philippines provides the bulk of the latter, about ten million persons and growing). National oppression has a concrete reality not entirely reducible to class exploitation but incomprehensible apart from it; that is, it cannot be adequately understood without the domination of the racialized peoples in the dependent formations by the colonizing/imperialist power, with the imperial nation-state acting as the exploiting class, as it were (see San Juan 1998; 2002). 32. **Racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy** (Wolf 1982; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). Solidarities conceived as racial or ethnic groups acquire meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; **ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these "racial" solidarities**. Such patterns of economic and political segmentation mutate in response to the impact of changing economic and political relationships (Geshwender and Levine 1994). Overall, there is no denying the fact that national-liberation movements and indigenous groups fighting for sovereignty, together with heterogeneous alliances and coalitions, cannot be fully understood without a critical analysis of the production of surplus value and its expropriation by the propertied class--that is, capital accumulation. As John Rex noted, different ethnic groups are placed in relations of cooperation, symbiosis or conflict by the fact that as groups they have different economic and political functions.Within this changing class order of [colonial societies], the language of racial difference frequently becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. What the type of analysis used here suggests is that the exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to capitalism and that ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation. Race relations and racial conflict are necessarily structured by political and economic factors of a more generalized sort (1983, 403-05, 407). Hence race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. **Corporate profit-making via class exploitation on an international/globalized scale, at bottom, still remains the logic of the world system of finance capitalism based on historically changing structures and retooled practices of domination and subordination.**

***Marxism isn’t blind to race – we’re the most effective way to challenge oppression***

**Taylor 11** [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, on the editorial board of the International Socialist Review and a doctoral student in African American Studies at Northwestern University; “Race, class and Marxism,” SocialistWorker.org, <http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism>]

Marxists believe that the potential for that kind of unity is dependant on battles and struggles against racism today. Without a commitment by revolutionary organizations in the here and now to the fight against racism, working-class unity will never be achieved and the revolutionary potential of the working class will never be realized. Yet despite all the evidence of this commitment to fighting racism over many decades, Marxism has been maligned as, at best, "blind" to combating racism and, at worst, "incapable" of it. For example, in an article published last summer, popular commentator and self-described "anti-racist" Tim Wise summarized the critique of "left activists" that he later defines as Marxists. He writes: [L]eft activists often marginalize people of color by operating from a framework of extreme class reductionism, which holds that the "real" issue is class, not race, that "the only color that matters is green," and that issues like racism are mere "identity politics," which should take a backseat to promoting class-based universalism and programs to help working people. This reductionism, by ignoring the way that even middle class and affluent people of color face racism and color-based discrimination (and by presuming that low-income folks of color and low-income whites are equally oppressed, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary) reinforces white denial, privileges white perspectivism and dismisses the lived reality of people of color. Even more, as we'll see, it ignores perhaps the most important political lesson regarding the interplay of race and class: namely, that the biggest reason why there is so little working-class consciousness and unity in the Untied States (and thus, why class-based programs to uplift all in need are so much weaker here than in the rest of the industrialized world), is precisely because of racism and the way that white racism has been deliberately inculcated among white working folks. Only by confronting that directly (rather than sidestepping it as class reductionists seek to do) can we ever hope to build cross-racial, class based coalitions. In other words, for the policies favored by the class reductionist to work--be they social democrats or Marxists--or even to come into being, racism and white supremacy must be challenged directly. Here, Wise accuses Marxism of: "extreme class reductionism," meaning that Marxists allegedly think that class is more important than race; **reducing struggles against racism to "mere identity politics**"; and requiring that struggles against racism should "take a back seat" to struggles over economic issues. Wise also accuses so-called "left activists" of reinforcing "white denial" and "dismiss[ing] the lived reality of people of color"--which, of course, presumes Left activists and Marxists to all be white. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - What do Marxists actually say? Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that **under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn**. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. **To claim**, as Marxists do, **that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny** or diminish **its importance** or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that ***oppressions*** can reinforce and compound each other, they ***are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation*** that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies. Despite the widespread beliefs to the contrary of his critics, Karl Marx himself was well aware of the centrality of race under capitalism. While Marx did not write extensively on the question of slavery and its racial impact in societies specifically, he did write about the way in which European capitalism emerged because of its pilfering, rape and destruction, famously writing: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of Black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. He also recognized the extent to which slavery was central to the world economy. He wrote: Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy--the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations. Thus slavery, because it is an economic category, has always existed among the institutions of the peoples. Modern nations have been able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise upon the New World. Thus, there is a fundamental understanding of the centrality of slave labor in the national and international economy. But what about race? Despite the dearth of Marx's own writing on race in particular, one might look at Marx's correspondence and deliberations on the American Civil War to draw conclusions as to whether Marx was as dogmatically focused on purely economic issues as his critics make him out be. One must raise the question: If Marx was reductionist, how is his unabashed support and involvement in abolitionist struggles in England explained? If Marx was truly an economic reductionist, he might have surmised that slavery and capitalism were incompatible, and simply waited for slavery to whither away. W.E.B. Du Bois in his Marxist tome Black Reconstruction, quotes at length a letter penned by Marx as the head of the International Workingmen's Association, written to Abraham Lincoln in 1864 in the midst of the Civil War: The contest for the territories which opened the epoch, was it not to decide whether the virgin soil of immense tracts should be wedded to the labor of the immigrant or be prostituted by the tramp of the slaver driver? When an oligarchy of 300,000 slave holders dared to inscribe for the first time in the annals of the world "Slavery" on the banner of armed revolt, when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one great Democratic Republic had first sprung up, whence the first declaration of the rights of man was issued...when on the very spots counter-revolution...maintained "slavery to be a beneficial institution"...and cynically proclaimed property in man 'the cornerstone of the new edifice'...then the working classes of Europe understood at once...that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy war of property against labor... They consider it an earnest sign of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggles for the rescue of the enchained race and the Reconstruction of a social order. Not only was Marx personally opposed to slavery and actively organized against it, but he theorized that slavery and the resultant race discrimination that flowed from it were not just problems for the slaves themselves, but for white workers who were constantly under the threat of losing work to slave labor. This did not mean white workers were necessarily sympathetic to the cause of the slaves--most of them were not. But Marx was not addressing the issue of consciousness, but objective factors when he wrote in Capital, "In the United States of America, every independent movement of the workers was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the Black it is branded." Moreover, Marx understood the dynamics of racism in a modern sense as well--as a means by which workers who had common, objective interests with each other could also become mortal enemies because of subjective, but nevertheless real, racist and nationalist ideas. Looking at the tensions between Irish and English workers, with a nod toward the American situation between Black and white workers, Marx wrote: Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude is much the same as that of the "poor whites" to the "niggers" in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it. Out of this quote, one can see a Marxist theory of how racism operated in contemporary society, after slavery was ended. Marx was highlighting three things: first, that capitalism promotes economic competition between workers; second, that the ruling class uses racist ideology to divide workers against each other; and finally, that when one group of workers suffer oppression, it negatively impacts the entire class.

#### Racism and white supremacy were RATIONALIZATIONS of a fundamentally economic system of slavery

Selfa ‘02 (Lance, “Slavery and the Origins of Racism, International Socialist Review, Issue 26, http://www.isreview.org/issues/26/roots\_of\_racism.shtml)

“All men are created equal” Within a few decades, the ideology of white supremacy was fully developed. Some of the greatest minds of the day—such as Scottish philosopher David Hume and Thomas Jefferson, the man who wrote the Declaration of Independence wrote treatises alleging Black inferiority. The ideology of white supremacy based on the natural inferiority of Blacks, even allegations that Blacks were subhuman, strengthened throughout the 18th century. This was the way that the leading intellectual figures of the time reconciled the ideals of the 1776 American Revolution with slavery. The American Revolution of 1776 and later the French Revolution of 1789 popularized the ideas of liberty and the rights of all human beings. The Declaration of Independence asserts that “all men are created equal” and possess certain “unalienable rights”—rights that can’t be taken away of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” As the first major bourgeois revolution, the American Revolution sought to establish the rights of the new capitalist class against the old feudal monarchy. It started with the resentment of the American merchant class that wanted to break free from British restrictions on its trading partners. But its challenge to British tyranny also gave expression to a whole range of ideas that expanded the concept of “liberty” from being just about trade to include ideas of human rights, democracy, and civil liberties. It legitimized an assault on slavery as an offense to liberty, so that some of the leading American revolutionaries, such as Thomas Paine and Benjamin Franklin, endorsed abolition. Slaves and free Blacks also pointed to the ideals of the revolution to call for getting rid of slavery. But because the revolution aimed to establish the rule of capital in America, and because a lot of capitalists and planters made a lot of money from slavery, the revolution compromised with slavery. The Declaration initially contained a condemnation of King George for allowing the slave trade, but Jefferson dropped it following protests from representatives from Georgia and the Carolinas. How could the founding fathers of the U.S.—most of whom owned slaves themselves—reconcile the ideals of liberty for which they were fighting with the existence of a system that represented the exact negation of liberty? The ideology of white supremacy fit the bill. We know today that “all men” didn’t include women, Indians, or most Blacks. But to rule Black slaves out of the blessings of liberty, the leading head-fixers of the time argued that Blacks weren’t really “men,” they were a lower order of being. Jefferson’s Notes from Virginia, meant to be a scientific catalog of the flora and fauna of Virginia, uses arguments that anticipate the “scientific racism” of the 1800s and 1900s. With few exceptions, no major institution—such as the universities, the churches, or the newspapers of the time—raised criticisms of white supremacy or of slavery. In fact, they helped pioneer religious and academic justifications for slavery and Black inferiority. As C.L.R. James put it, “[T]he conception of dividing people by race begins with the slave trade. This thing was so shocking, so opposed to all the conceptions of society which religion and philosophers hadÖthat the only justification by which humanity could face it was to divide people into races and decide that the Africans were an inferior race.”23 White supremacy wasn’t only used to justify slavery. It was also used to keep in line the two-thirds of Southern whites who weren’t slaveholders. Unlike the French colony of St. Domingue or the British colony of Barbados, where Blacks vastly outnumbered whites, Blacks represented a minority in the slave South. A tiny minority of slave-holding whites, who controlled the governments and economies of the Deep South states, ruled over a population that was roughly two-thirds white farmers and workers and one-third Black slaves. The slaveholders’ ideology of racism and white supremacy helped to divide the working population, tying poor whites to the slaveholders. Slavery afforded poor white farmers what Fields called a “social space” whereby they preserved an illusory “independence” based on debt and subsistence farming while the rich planters continued to dominate Southern politics and society. “A caste system as well as a form of labor,” historian James M. McPherson wrote, “slavery elevated all whites to the ruling caste and thereby reduced the potential for class conflict.”24

#### The aff is a fundamental misreading of history

\*\* No where is the failure of the aff’s paradigm more evident then in their argument we should begin with blackness and slavery.  The aff’s re-telling of the history of slavery omits the central cause of the slave-trade:  class.  Absent an accurate understanding of historical process, they cannot hope to redress the harms of past injustice.

Slav, prejudice predate not cap

Darder, and Torress, 04 [Antonia, Prof of education policy studies at U of Illinois, and Rodolfo, Associate prof of latino studies at UC Irvine, After Race:  Racism after multiculturalism, p.6-8 //liam]

Although today “race” is generally linked to phenotypic characteris tics, there is a strong consensus among evolutionary biologists and ge netic anthropologists that “biologically identifiable human races do not exist; Homo sapiens constitute a single species, and have been so since their evolution in Africa and throughout their migration around the world” (Lee, Mountain, and Koenig 2001, 39). This perspective is simi lar to that which existed prior to the eighteenth century, when the notion that there were distinct populations whose differences were grounded in biology did not exist. For the Greeks, for example, the term “barbarian” was tied to how civilized a people were considered to be (generally based on language rather than genetics). So how did all this begin? George Fredrickson (2002), writing on the history of racism, identifies the anticipatory moment of modern racism with the “treatment of Jew ish converts to Christianity in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain. Conversos were identified and discriminated against because of the belief held by Christians that the impurity of their blood made them incapable of experiencing a true conversion” (31). Fredrickson argues that the racism inherent in the quasi-religious, Spanish doctrine of limpeza de sangre, referring to purity of blood, set the stage for the spread of racism to the New World: To the extent that it was enforced represented the stigmatization of an entire ethnic group on the basis of deficiencies that allegedly could not be eradicated by conversion or assimilation. Inherited social status was nothing new; the concept of “noble blood” had long meant that the off spring of certain families were born with a claim to high status. But when the status of large numbers of people was depressed purely and simply because of their derivation from a denigrated ethnos, a line had been crossed that gave “race” a new and more comprehensive significance. (33) Hence, religious notions, steeped in an ideology of “race,” played a significant role in the exportation of racism into the Americas, wheiie domination by the superior “race” was perceived as “inevitable and de sirable, because it was thought to lead to human progress” (Castles 1996, 21). The emergence of “race” as ideology can also be traced to the rise of nationalism. Efforts by nation-states to extend or deny rights of citizenship contingent on “race” or “ethnicity” were not uncommon, even within so-called democratic republics. Here, national mythology about those with “the biological unfitness for full citizenship” (Fredrickson 2002, 68) served to sanction exclusionary practices, despite the fact that all people shared “the historical process of migration and intermingling” (Castles 1996, 21). Herein is contained the logic behind what Valle and Torres (2000) term “the policing of race,” a condition that results in official policies and practices by the nation-state designed to exclude or curtail the rights of racialized populations. In Germany, the Nazi regime took the logic of “race” to its pinnacle, rendering Jewish and Gypsy pop ulations a threat to the state, thus rationalizing and justifying their demise. This example disrupts the notion that racism occurs only within the context of black-white relations. Instead, Castles (1996) argues that economic exploitation has always been central to the emergence of racism. Whether it incorporated slavery or indentured servitude, racial ized systems of labor were perpetrated in Europe against inunigrants, in cluding Irish, Jewish, and Polish workers, as well as against indigenous populations around the world. In the midst of the “scientific” penchant of the eighteenth century, Carolus Linneaus developed one of the first topologies to actually cate gorize human beings into four distinct subspecies: americanus, asiaticus, africanus, and europeaeus. Linneaus’s classification, allegedly neutral and scientific, included not only physical features but also behavioral charac teristics, hierarchically arranged in accordance with the prevailing social values and the political-economic interests of the times. The predictable result is the current ideological configuration of “race”. used to both ex plain and control social behavior. Etienne Balibar’s (2003) work on racism is useful in understanding the ideological justifications that historically have accompanied the exclu sion and domination of racialized populations—a phenomenon heavily fueled by the tensions of internal migration in the Current era of global ization. [R]acism describes in an abstract idealizing manner “types of human ity,” and. . . makes extensive use of classifications which allow all indi viduals and groups to imagine answers for the most immediate existen tial questions, such as imposition of identities and the permanence of vi olence between nations, ethnic or religious communities. (3) Balibar also points to the impact of “symbolic projections and media tions” (in particula; stereotypes and prejudices linked to divine-human ity or bestial-animality) in the construction of racialized formations. “Racial” classification becomes associated with a distinction between the “properly human” and its imaginary (animal-like) “other.” Such projec tions and mediations, Balibar argues, are inscribed with modernity’s ex pansionist rationality—a quasi-humanist conception that suggests that differences and inequalities are the result of unequal access and social ex clusion from cultural, political, or intellectual life but also implies that these differences and inequalities represent normal patterns, given the level of “humanity” or “animality” attributed to particular populations. James Baldwin in “A Talk to Teachers” (1988) links this phenomenon of racialization to the political economy and its impact on African Ameri cans.The point of all this is that Black men were brought here as a source of cheap labor. They were indispensable to the economy. In order to justify the fact that men were treated as though they were animals, the white re public had to brain wash itself into believing that they were indeed ani mals and deserved to be treated like animals. (7) Lee, Mountain, and Koenig (2001) note, “the taxonomy of race has al ways been and continues to be primarily political” (43). Since politics and economics actually constitute one sphere, it is more precise to say that the ideology of “race” continues to be primarily about political economy. Thus, historians of “race” and racism argue that the idea of immutable, biologically determined “races” is a direct outcome of exploration and colonialism, which furnished the “scientific” justification for the eco nomic exploitation, slavery, and even genocide of those groups perceived as subhuman.

#### Modern anti-blackness was born out of class based discrimination

\*\* Claims that the middle passage was the “first” is both historically inaccurate and politically problematic – indentured servitude was the first forced immigration.

Walsh and Jordan 8

White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America

Don Jordan is a television producer and director who has worked on dozens of documentaries and dramas. He also co-produced and co-wrote Love is the Devil, a film about the life of Francis Bacon.

Michael Walsh spent twelve years as a reporter and presenter on World in Action and has won six awards for his work. He is now a producer, specialising in political and historical documentaries.

While the Spanish slaughtered in America for gold, the English in
America had to plant for their wealth. Failing to find the expcctcd
mineral riches along the eastern seaboard, they turned to farming,
hoping to make gold from tobacco. They needed a compliant,
subservient, preferably free labour force and since the indigenous
peoples of America were difficult to enslave they turned to their
own homeland to provide. They imported Britons deemed to be
'surplus' people - the rootless, the unemployed, the criminal and
the dissident - and held them in the Americas in various forms of
bondage for anything from three years to life.

This book tells the story of these victims of empire. They were
all supposed to gain their freedom eventually. For many, it didn't
work out that way. In the early decades, half of them died in
bondage. This book tracks the evolution of the system in which
tens of thousands of whites were held as chattels, marketed like
cattle, punished brutally and in some cases literally worked to death.
For decades, **this underclass was treated just as savagely as black**

**slaves and**, indeed, toiled, **suffered and rebelled alongside them.**
Eventually, a racial wedge was thrust between white and black,
leaving blacks officially enslaved and whites apparently upgraded
but in reality just as enslaved as they were before. According to
contemporaries, some whites were treated with less humanity than
the blacks working alongside them.

Among the first to be sent were children. Some were dispatched
by impoverished parents seeking a better life for them. But others
were forcibly deported. In 1618, the authorities in London began
to sweep up hundreds of troublesome urchins from the slums and,
ignoring protests from the children and their families, shipped them
to Virginia.1 England's richest man was behind this mass expulsion.
It was presented as an act of charity': the 'starving children' were to

be given a new start as apprentices in America. In fact, they were
sold to planters to work in the fields and half of them were dead
within a year. Shipments of children continued from England and
then from Ireland for decades. Many of these migrants were little
more than toddlers. In 1661, the wife of a man who imported four
"Irish boys' into Maryland as servants wondered why her husband
had not brought 'some cradles to have rocked them in' as they
were 'so little'.

A second group of forced migrants from the mother country
were those, such as vagrants and petty criminals, whom England's
rulers wished to be rid of. The legal ground was prepared for
their relocation by a highwayman turned Lord Chief Justice who
argued for England's gaols to be emptied in America. Thanks to
men like him, 50,000 to 70,000 convicts (or maybe more) were
transported to Virginia, Maryland, Barbados and England's other
American possessions before 1776. All manner of others considered
undesirable by the British Crown were also dispatched across the
Atlantic to be sold into servitude. They ranged from beggars to
prostitutes, Quakers to Cavaliers.2

A third group were the Irish. For centuries, Ireland had been
something of a special case in English colonial history. From the
Anglo-Normans onwards, the Irish were dehumanised, described
as savages, so making their murder and displacement appear all the
more justified. The colonisation of Ireland provided experience and
drive for experiments further afield, not to mention large numbers
of workers, coerced, transported or persuaded. Under Oliver
Cromwell's ethnic-cleansing policy in Ireland, unknown numbers
of Catholic men, women and children were forcibly transported
to the colonics. And it did not end with Cromwell; for at least
another hundred years, forced transportation continued as a fact
of life in Ireland.

The other unwilling participants in the colonial labour force were
the kidnapped. Astounding numbers are reported to have been
snatched from the streets and countryside by gangs of kidnappers
or 'spirits' working to satisfy the colonial hunger for labour. Based
at every sizeable port in the British Isles, spirits conned or cocrccd
the unwary onto ships bound for America. London's most active

kidnap gang discusscd their targets at a daily meeting in St Paul's
Cathedral. They were reportedly paid £2 by planters' agents for
every athletic-looking young man they brought aboard. According
to a contemporary who campaigned against the black slave trade,
kidnappers were snatching an average of around 10,000 whites a
year - doubtless an exaggeration but one that indicates a problem
serious enough to create its own grip on the popular mind.3

Along with the vast numbers ejected from Britain and forced to
slave in the colonics were the still greater multitudes who went of
their own free will: those who became indentured servants in the
Americas in return for free passage and perhaps the promise of a plot
of land. Between 1620 and 1775, these volunteer servants, some
300,000, accounted for two out of three migrants from the British
Isles.4 Typically, these 'free-\villcrs', as they came to be called, were
the poor and the hopeful who agreed to sacrificc their personal
liberty for a period of years in the eventual hope of a better life.
On arrival, they found that they had the status of chattels, objects
of personal property', with few effective rights. But there was no
going back. They were stuck like the tar on the keels of the ships

that brought them. Some, of course, were bought by humane,
even generous, masters and survived their years of bondage quite
happily to emerge from servitude to build a prosperous future.
But some of the most abused servants were from among the frce-
willers.

#### \*\* Black slavery developed from intro-racial slavery. This doesn’t diminish its importance, but this recognition is crucial to accurate analysis and recognition of the class component of oppression

Walsh and Jordan 8

White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America

Don Jordan is a television producer and director who has worked on dozens of documentaries and dramas. He also co-produced and co-wrote Love is the Devil, a film about the life of Francis Bacon.

Michael Walsh spent twelve years as a reporter and presenter on World in Action and has won six awards for his work. He is now a producer, specialising in political and historical documentaries.

It invites uproar to describe as slaves any of these hapless whites
who were abused, beaten and sometimes killed by their masters or
their masters' overseers. To do so is thought to detract from the
enormity of black suffering after racial slavery developed. **However,
black slavery emerged out of white servitude and was based upon it.**
As the African-American writer Lerone Bennett Jr has observed:

When someone removes the cataracts of whiteness from
our eyes, and when we look with unclouded vision on the
bloody shadows of the American past, we will recognize
for the first time that the Afro-American, who was so often
second in freedom, was also second in slavery.5

Of course, black slavery had hideous aspects that whites did not
experience, but they suffered horrors in common, many of which
were first endured by whites. In crude economic terms, indentured
servants sold their labour for a set period of time; in reality they
sold themselves. They discovered that they were placed under the
power of masters who had more or less total control over their
destiny.

The indentured-servant system evolved into slavery because of
the economic goals of early colonists: it was designed not so much
to help would-be migrants get to America and the Caribbean as
to provide a cheap and compliant workforce for the cash-crop
industry. Once this was established, to keep the workforce in check
it became necessary to create legal sanctions that included violence
and physical restraint. This is what led to slavery: first for whites,
then for blacks.

#### \*\* The colonial period wasn’t marked by clear racial hatred – class caused plantation owners terrorized poor whites AND blacks. Slavery was necessary for plantation land expansion and capital acquisition.

Michelle Alexander 2010, associate prof of law, Stanford Law, director of Stanford’s Civil Rights Clinic. Winner of Soros Justice Fellowship, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, p. 23-4, KEL

The concept of race is a relatively recent development. Only in the past few centuries, owing largely to European imperialism, have the world’s people been classified along racial lines.4 Here, in America, the idea of race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery—as well as the extermination of American Indians—with the ideals of freedom preached by whites in the new colonies. In the early colonial period, hen settlements remained relatively small, indentured servitude was the dominant means of securing cheap labor. Under this system, whites and blacks struggled to survive against a common enemy, what historian [crone Bennett Jr. describes as “the big planter apparatus and a social system that legalized terror against black and white bonds men.”3 Initially, blacks brought to this country were not all enslaved: man were treated as indentured servants. As plantation farming expanded, particularly tobacco and cotton farming, demand increased greatly for both labor and land. The demand for land was met by invading and conquering larger and larger swaths of territory. American Indians became a growing impediment to white European “progress,” and during this period, the images of American Indians promoted in books, newspapers, and magazines became increasingly negative. As sociologists Keith Kilty and Eric Swank have observed, eliminating “savages is less of a moral problem than eliminating human beings, and therefore American Indians carne to he understood as a lesser race—uncivilized savages— thus providing a justification For the extermination of the native peoples. The growing demand for labor on plantations was met through slavery. American Indians were considered unsuitable as slaves, largely because native tribes were clearly in a position to fight back. The fear of raids by Indian tribes led plantation owners to grasp for an alternative source of free labor. European immigrants were also deemed poor candidates for slavery, not because of their race, but rather because they were in short supply and enslavement would, quite naturally interfere with voluntary immigration to the new colonies. Plantation owners thus viewed Africans, who were relatively powerless, as the ideal slaves. The systematic enslavement of Africans, and the rearing of their children under bondage, emerged with all deliberate speed—quickened by events such as bacons Rebellion.

#### \*\* Slaves were taken from Africa because they lacked English speaking skills necessary to form class alliances with poor whites

Michelle Alexander 2010, associate prof of law, Stanford Law, director of Stanford’s Civil Rights Clinic. Winner of Soros Justice Fellowship, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, p. 24, KEL

In an effort to protect their superior status and economic position, the planters shifted their strategy for maintaining dominance. They abandoned their heavy reliance on indentured servants in favor of the importation of more black slaves. Instead of importing English-speaking slaves from the West Indies, who were more likely to be familiar with European language and culture, many more slaves were shipped directly from Africa. These slaves would be far easier to control and far less likely to form alliances with poor whites.

#### \*\* Plantation owners pitted poor whites against poor blacks with access to land and capital in order to divide the labor force against itself, causing centuries of white privilege and racial conflict

Michelle Alexander 2010, associate prof of law, Stanford Law, director of Stanford’s Civil Rights Clinic. Winner of Soros Justice Fellowship, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, p. 25, KEL

Fearful that such measures might not be sufficient to protect their interests, the planter class took an additional precautionary step, a step that would later come to be known as a “racial bribe.” Deliberately and strategically, the planter class extended special privileges to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge between them and black slaves. White settlers were allowed greater access to Native American lands, white servants were allowed to police slaves through slave patrols and militias, and barriers were created so that free labor would not he placed in competition with slave labor. These measures effectively eliminated the risk of future alliances between black slaves and poor whites. Poor whites suddenly had a direct, personal stake in the existence of a race-based system of slavery. Their own plight had not improved by much, but at least they were not slaves. Once the planter elite split the labor force, poor whites responded to the logic of their situation and sought ways to expand their racially privileged position.

### Other

***The aff is a snake eating its own tail – ontologically opposing Blackness to Whiteness makes Black struggle STRUCTURALLY dependent on the existence of White Racism and wounded attachments to suffering***

**Pinn** 20**04** (Anthony, Anthony B. Pinn is an American professor and writer whose work focuses on liberation theology, Black religion, and Black humanism. Pinn is the Agnes Cullen Arnold Professor of Humanities and Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University, “‘‘Black Is, Black Ain’t’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology, Volume 43, Number 1 . Spring 2004)

This connection between ontological blackness and¶ religion is natural because: ‘‘ontological blackness signifies¶ the totality of black existence, a binding together¶ of black life and experience. In its root, religio, religion¶ denotes tying together, fastening behind, and binding¶ together. **Ontological blackness renders black life and**¶ **experience a totality**.’’13 According to Anderson, Black¶ theological discussions are entangled in ontological¶ blackness. And accordingly, **discussions of black life**¶ **revolve around a theological understanding of Black**¶ **experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist**¶ **system**. The goal of this theology is to find the ‘‘meaning¶ of black faith’’ in the merger of black cultural¶ consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War¶ II Black defiance. **An admirable goal to be sure, but**¶ **here is the rub: Black theologians speak**, according to¶ Anderson, **in opposition to ontological whiteness**¶ **when they are actually dependent upon whiteness for**¶ **the legitimacy of their agenda**. Furthermore, **ontological**¶ **blackness’s strong ties to suffering and survival**¶ **result in blackness being dependent on suffering**,¶ and as a result social transformation brings into¶ question what it means to be black and religious.¶ **Liberative outcomes ultimately force an identity**¶ **crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility**. In¶ Anderson’s words:¶ **Talk about liberation becomes hard to justify**¶ **where freedom appears as nothing more than**¶ **defiant self-assertion of a revolutionary racial**¶ **consciousness that requires for its legitimacy**¶ **the opposition of white racism**. **Where there**¶ **exists no possibility of transcending the blackness**¶ **that whiteness created, African America**n¶ **theologies of liberation must be seen not only**¶ **as crisis theologies; they remain theologies in**¶ **a crisis of legitimation**.14¶ This conversation becomes more ‘‘refined’’ as new¶ cultural resources are unpacked and various religious¶ alternatives acknowledged. Yet the bottom line¶ remains racialization of issues and agendas, life and¶ love. Falsehood is perpetuated through the ‘‘hermeneutic¶ of return,’’ by which ontological blackness is¶ the paradigm of Black existence and thereby sets the¶ agenda of Black liberation within the ‘‘postrevolutionary¶ context’’ of present day USA. One ever finds¶ the traces of the Black aesthetic which pushes for a¶ dwarfed understanding of Black life and a sacrifice of¶ individuality for the sake of a unified Black ‘faith’.¶ Yet differing experiences of racial oppression (the¶ stuff of ontological blackness) combined with varying¶ experiences of class, gender and sexual oppression¶ call into question the value of their racialized formulations. Implicit in all of this is a crisis of faith,¶ an unwillingness to address both the glory and guts¶ of Black existence—***nihilistic tendencies*** that, unless¶ held in tension with claims of transcendence, ***have***¶ ***the potential to overwhelm and to suffocate***.¶ At the heart of this dilemma is friction between¶ ontological blackness and ‘‘contemporary postmodern¶ black life’’—issues, for example related to¶ ‘‘selecting marriage partners, exercising freedom of¶ movement, acting on gay and lesbian preferences, or¶ choosing political parties.’’15 How does one foster¶ balance while embracing difference as positive?¶ Anderson looks to Nietzsche.¶ European genius, complete with its heroic epic,¶ met its match in the aesthetic categories of tragedy¶ and the grotesque genius revived and espoused by¶ Friedreich Nietzsche. The grotesque genius served¶ as an effective counter-discourse by embracing both¶ the ‘light’ and ‘dark’ aspects of life, and holding in¶ tension oppositional sensations—pleasure and pain,¶ freedom and oppression.16 Utilizing Nietzsche’s¶ work, Anderson ask: ‘‘what should African American¶ cultural and religious criticism look like when¶ they are no longer romantic in inspiration and¶ the cult of heroic genius is displaced by the¶ grotesquery—full range of expression, actions, attitudes,¶ behaviors everything found in African¶ American life—of contemporary black expressive¶ culture and public life?’’17¶ Applied to African Americans, the grotesque¶ embodies the full range of African American¶ life—all expressions, actions, attitudes, and behavior.¶ With a hermeneutic of the grotesque as the¶ foci, religio-cultural criticism is free from the totalizing¶ nature of racial apologetics and the classical¶ Black aesthetic. By extension, Black theology is able¶ to address both issues of survival (Anderson sees¶ their importance.) and the larger goal of cultural¶ fulfillment, Anderson’s version of liberation. That¶ is to say**, placing ‘‘blackness’’ along side other indicators**¶ **of identity allows African Americans to**¶ **define themselves in a plethora of ways while maintaining**¶ **their community status. This encourages**¶ **African Americans to see themselves as they are**—¶ **complex and diversified—no longer needing to**¶ **surrender personal interests for the sake of monolithic**¶ **collective status.**

# 2nc

### Their stuff

#### The roll of ballot, if there is one, coming out of the 2AC --- is to give up your badge and stop policing anti-blackness --- this is a flawed starting point --- it ignores who really carries the badges and who really has their hands on the levers of power.

#### The politics of the affirmative essentializes modern black-life – the impact is a failed political strategy of resistance – vote neg

McWhorter 9—Associate Professor in the English and Comparative Literature, Columbia (John, What African-American Studies Could Be, [www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2009/09/by\_john\_mcwhorter\_while\_this.html](http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2009/09/by_john_mcwhorter_while_this.html))

The answer common in such departments is that the principal mission is to teach students about the eternal power of racism past and present. Certainly it should be part of a liberal arts education to learn that racism is more than face-to-face abuse, and that social inequality is endemic to American society. However, too often the curriculum of African-American Studies departments gives the impression that racism and disadvantage are the most important things to note and study about being black.

The question is whether this, for all of its moral urgency in the local sense, qualifies as education under any serious definition.

Typical is the curriculum of one African-American Studies department in a solid, selective state school west of the Mississippi. In this department, racism is, essentially, everything.

One course teaches that "Housing discrimination systematically skews opportunities and life chances," another that "racism, sexism, and heterosexism shape black life chances in a 21st century context," while yet another zeroes in on "the effects of institutional racism on social policy, desegregation, integration, and affirmative action programs."

Then there is "Blacks in the Media" - or, rather, one slice of that subject: "Studying literature, comic books, comic strips, cartoons, music, theater, cinema, broadcasting, and television, students will analyze the mythical imageries which have created stereotypes." This is a common trope in writings on black performance, in which any performer can be jammed into a category such as "Mammy" or "Tragic Mulatto," sidestepping the nevertheless brilliant performances of people like Ethel Waters and Fredi Washington in the old days, or Queen Latifah and Halle Berry today.

Following from this glum desperation is a ~~fetishization~~ of radical politics as blacks' only constructive allegiance. One would never know the marginal import of radicalism to most black lives from its centrality to so many African-American Studies department syllabi. One course analyzes "the tradition of radical thought and the relevance of this thought to the needs and interests of the black community" - but what does the "relevance" consist of except intellectually? Yet the same department also offers a course on, more specifically, black Marxism.

According to this curriculum, being black has been so horrific that we are even challenged by the mere physicality of existence. One courses teaches that black women's bodies have to be "important spaces of resistance," while another is based on the idea that black people have been done in by various permutations of "urban spatial relations."

Because racism and inequality will always exist in some forms, this all qualifies as a bone-deep, almost willful pessimism about black potential. One would expect the thinking class of a troubled race to at least pay more lip service to looking forward. The set-jawed obsession with tabulating obstacles becomes almost peculiar, as if based on an assumption that in some way, black Americans are uniquely exempt from treating challenges as surmountable. There is even a course on black psychology whose description would get a white-run department picketed out of existence in a week, examining "manifestations of various psychological characteristics of people of African decent [sic], their cultual [sic] and behavioral norms, including the way that issues of race, class, gender and sexuality affect their cognitive, social, and emotional development."

One senses that the people teaching in African-American Studies departments feel that blackness is indeed something very different, likely because African slaves were unwilling immigrants. However, Ralph Ellison once asked "Can a people live and develop for over three hundred years simply by reacting?"

To those who would consider themselves representing black people by answering in the affirmative, there are legions of black people of all walks who would heartily disagree. There is no self-standing metric of unassailable truth that justifies intellectuals treating that disagreement - that is, the life-spirit of a people millions strong making the best of the worst for four hundred years -- as unworthy of serious address.

As to the possible objection that course descriptions do not engage these departments closely enough, a look at a few actual course syllabi is useful.

At the University of Pennsylvania, the syllabus for "Racial and Sexual Conflict" openly states that "The term paper for this course should be concerned with the structure, causes, and policies that attempt to alleviate or perpetuate racial and/or sexual discrimination in the United States." Technically, this stipulation could allow an exploration of what people have done to get past obstacles rather than merely describe them. However, the material covered in this course gives precious little support to such an endeavor.

One week, the discussion concerns the questions as to "What role does educational opportunity play in economic opportunity? How has government policy affected educational opportunity by race?" However, the readings include none of the academic literature by scholars such as Joleen Kirschenman, Kathryn Neckerman, Jomills Braddock, James McPartland and Alford Young on how attitudinal factors affect the hireability of many uneducated black men, none of the literature on solid job opportunities for people without college degrees, and nothing on organizations nationwide assisting people in taking advantage of such opportunities. In a course purporting to teach America's brightest and most ambitious students about urgent realities, how are sources such as these irrelevant?

At the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, one course exemplifies the focus on radicalism. "Race, Radicalism and African American Culture" seeks to "track the genealogy of the movement that came to be called 'Black Power,' and to situate black radical artists and intellectuals in the broader history of twentieth-century American thought, culture, and politics."

And the course covers a noble procession of figures: Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, Richard Wright, Paul Robeson, the Black Panthers, Amiri Baraka, Cornel West, Bell Hooks. Not to mention James Baldwin. And Malcolm X. And Stokely Carmichael. Upon which the simple question is: despite their resonance, what effect did any of these people have upon the fact that there are today more middle-class black people than poor ones? Which was more central to making whites comfortable enough with blackness to elect a black President, the legacy of Malcolm X or the legacy of Dr. King?

As to King, the course does address Bayard Rustin, who was central to organizing the March on Washington. But he was at loggerheads with black radicals as the sixties wore on. The main legacy of black radicalism has been mood and fashion. Is its centrality to so many African-American Studies departments' curricula a matter of comprehensive engagement with black political development? Or is it what happens to be a common political orientation among modern academics in the humanities, including black ones?

To the extent that the answer is the latter, students are being underserved. At Columbia, in one African-American Studies course Manning Marable assigns an article by Robin Kelley called "Beyond the 'Real' World, or Why Black Radicals Need to Wake Up and Start Dreaming." But which black radical dreams have borne fruit in a way that would elicit a salute from ordinary black people in 2009? Dr. King had a dream indeed -- but he didn't mean us to stop there.

The issue is not the quality of these courses in themselves. I will gladly assume that these professors are all excellent lecturers, assiduous researchers and dedicated mentors. Yet attention must be paid to their ideological bias nevertheless. An African-American Studies curriculum whose main message is that black Americans' most interesting experience has always been racism, still is, and that this requires radicalism as a politics of choice is not education. It is indoctrination. It proposes a single minority view as sense incarnate. This is not what education is supposed to be.

To the extent that these courses and syllabi are typical, then, there is a problem. And anyone familiar with African-American Studies departments knows that these courses and syllabi are, indeed, typical.

African-American Studies departments have a place in a liberal arts education. However, to deserve that inclusion in anything beyond a symbolic sense, they should revise their curricula in exactly two ways, simple but crucial.

First, there should be full acknowledgment in all courses that the role of racism in black people's lives and fates is receding, and to such a degree that the race's challenges today are vastly different than they were forty years ago.

The aim should not be to downplay the reality of racism, but to present precisely what education consists of: the ambiguities and challenges of real life and how one thinks about it.

Defeatism should be discouraged. Any sense that defeatism is the empirically proper position on black American history in the same way as it would have been for Pompeiians in the face of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius fails -- for the simple reason that progress for black Americans continues on so many fronts.

Most of the people in question would resist being characterized as defeatist, or as not acknowledging change. However, there is acknowledgment and there is genuflection. Plus, a claim that black radicalism is our only real future is, in itself, defeatism. Four centuries of black history give no indication that these politics will significantly affect how most black people thrive.

For example, a course like Yale's on "African-American Politics" should include not only mention of the Bradley Effect (under which whites voters have claimed in polls that they would vote for black candidates but do not at the voting booth) but also that it has been proven to be on the wane repeatedly for twenty years, including in the election of Barack Obama. Otherwise, Yale's teachings will lag behind what even Wikipedia tells us about the reality on the Bradley Effect, as opposed to its recruitment as a strategy of indoctrination.

The course I mentioned on blacks' problems with urban space flags environmental racism - but would ideally mention the important work of Christopher Foreman of the Brookings Institution (black, for the record) showing that claims along these lines have been overblown.

It must also fall out of this that there will be no such thing as a course shoehorning the careers of hundreds of hard-working and excellent black artists and performers as lessons in stereotyping, or as most interesting for how they were hemmed in by racism than for what they accomplished regardless. Just as it is impossible to imagine Jewish Americans submitting themselves to so dispiriting and reductive a historiography of performance as this one, black scholars should step away from this kind of thinking as giving in to, rather than coping with, the ills of our history.

In the same vein, black popular music (including hip hop) should not be treated as most interesting in how it happened to intersect with (leftist and radical) political ideology - anymore than klezmer music, Chinese opera, or Tchaikovsky is. What about how our music is just good?

Second, an African-American Studies department should be considered larval without a course on black conservative thought - upon which courses on black radicalism would then be acceptable as alternative arguments.

Crucially, token assignment of writings of ancient three-named figures like Booker T. Washington, who wrote amidst post-Civil War conditions now ancient history, are a mere beginning. Most departments already slip in Washington, for example - although they should now regularly engage Robert Norrell's new biography that rescues the man from a century of calumny.

However, equally central to honest engagement with "black thought" are modern figures often considered controversial by the campus set, such as Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell, Walter Williams, Debra Dickerson, and Stanley Crouch. (I will refrain from putting myself on this list, but will mention that my work is not uncommonly assigned to college students and seems not to leave them deaf to America's sociological imperfections.) Also useful, given that African-American Studies syllabi typically include some white writers, would be Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom, Lawrence Mead, Dan Subotnik and Peter Wood.

There is an argument hardly unfamiliar in the halls of ivy that black writers of this ilk are irrelevant to serious discussion because they are traitors to the race. Those charges must be permitted as free speech - but have no place in any brand of academic inquiry. All of the writers I have listed are careful thinkers deeply concerned with the fate of black America. It will not do to tar them as "not scholarly" because they do not all write in academic format or publish in obscure scholarly journals. Writings typically assigned by James Baldwin, Cornel West or even most of the others in this school are not written in this format either.

Thomas Sowell is read by millions in a nationally syndicated column, and this is in part because he is an economics and history scholar of long standing, whose books are often festooned with footnotes and references to academic work. Shelby Steele won the National Book Award, because of rhetorical skill surely the equal of writers like Patricia Williams and Michael Eric Dyson. Stanley Crouch is a polymath whose salty, "down" essence challenges anyone's claim that not being with the black radical program means not being "culturally black."

To be sure, many professors in African-American Studies departments think of themselves as doing their jobs in what they term "contesting" assorted topics. An example is Marable's "Critical Approaches to African-American Studies" at Columbia in which the contesting is the likes of "Remapping the black experience," "Redefining whiteness," and "Race-ing justice." However, this is a rearranging of furniture, very en famille. The confrontational, leftwardly politicized assumptions remain steadfast - while millions of blacks have overcome having never heard of politics of this kind.

These views, nevertheless, have value and should be heard. Yet they are not, on their own, truth. They verge into excess and anti-empiricism as readily as views from the right. There exist as many intelligent "contestings" of these leftist views as there exist "contestings" of the writings of Shelby Steele or myself. In a university department worth the status, contesting from all sides must be heard.

#### Aff approaches black identity from the wrong direction: Racial essence leads us on misguided quests, instead we should accept the contingent nature of our lives: This is the only way to engage politics

**Glaude 2007 (Eddie, Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton, *In a Shade of Blue,* 50-51)**

I am also not interested in defending an essentialist conception of race or of black identity. **Talk of racial essences is at best a bad way of talking about particular experiences; at worst it encourages misguided quests for certainty that aim to secure us from the contingency that is an inherent part of our lives.** My intention is to offer a pragmatic way of thinking about black identity that takes seriously the problem-solving activity intrinsic to being a moral agent. My emphasis, then, will be on our capacity as black individuals to judge the respective claims of duty and desire as they arise in concrete experience, understanding that in some cases they may indeed conflict. We will still speak of black identity but will attempt not to overextend its reach. **When someone utters a sentence such as “I am an African American” in the context of a debate about public policy, she is not disclosing something that was previously internal; instead, her words indicate to those around her that, in discussing this particular topic with her, another set of issues must be taken into account**. Richard Rorty makes the point best: **Such sentences are not used to report events going on within the Cartesian Theatre which is a person’s consciousness. They are simply tools for coordinating our behavior with those of others**. This is not to say that one can “reduce” mental states such as beliefs and desires to physiological or behavioural states. It is merely to say that **there is no point in asking whether a belief represents reality, either mental reality or physical reality, accurately. That is, for pragmatists, not only a bad question, but the root of much wasted philosophical energy**. 4 **The question, then, is not whether our beliefs about race and racial identities represent reality, but for what purposes it would be useful to hold such beliefs and to invoke them as crucial aspects of our identities.** In what follows I sketch two ways of understanding black identity— what I call an archeological approach and a pragmatic historicist approach— in each case focusing on its ethical dimensions. 5 I argue that the pragmatic approach better enables us to understand the complex ethical choices that attend any talk about black identity.I further draw out the implications for contemporary debates about black identity of what I have called elsewhere a pragmatic tradition of racial advocacy, which emerged in the early nineteenth century as African Americans drew on the biblical story of Exodus to articulate a sense of peoplehood and racial obligation. 6 In the end, I suggest that **we have approached the issue of black identity from the wrong direction: it is not simply a question of who we are determining how we act in the world. Rather, the choices we make in the face of problems and meddlesome circumstances turn out to be our lives, requiring of us continual cultivation of our ability to make delicate distinctions.**

#### Their conception of Blackness leads them to be inactive in a world that needs to be able to make delicate political decisions. This political strategy in debate undermines the preconditions for progressive change and justifies voting negative.

Glaude 2007 **(Eddie, Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton, *In a Shade of Blue,* 51-54)**

**We can think of black identity in terms of a specific form of life that binds a group of individuals to one another— a sort of collective true self. This form is distinct from that of other peoples— perhaps different in its conception of knowledge, in its understanding of beauty, and in its formulation of the moral and ethical norms that ought to guide action in the world.** In this view, black identity reflects the common historical experiences and shared vocabularies “which provide us, as one people, with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history.” 7 This singular constellation is the essence of the people and constitutive of who we are as individuals. In Identity in Democracy, Amy Gutmann describes a view of cultural identity groups in which culture represents a way of life that is comprehensive: it “constitutes and constrains the identities (and therefore the lives) of its members by providing them with a common language, history, institutions of socialization, range of occupations, lifestyles, distinctive literary and artistic traditions, architectural styles, music, dress, ceremonies and holidays, and customs that are shared by an intergenerational community that occupies a distinctive territory.” 8 Gutmann discusses African Americans mainly in her chapter on processes of ascription. I suspect she does not consider them a cultural identity group because they do not occupy a distinctive territory. But black identity is no less complexly articulated. It may involve racial as well as cultural or political dimensions, depending in part on the ends to which it is invoked. 9 When articulated as a particular form of black nationalist politics, for example, black identity is much like the cultural identity group Gutmann talks about. The black nation provides the boundaries within which we think of our political ambitions (territorial or cultural sovereignty for example), who we are (racial consanguinity), how we understand our relation to people outside the group, and, perhaps most important, how we understand our obligations to one another. Here the **notions of good and obligation proceed out of our understanding of the racial self. In other words**, for black nationalists of a certain sort, **black identities and the culture out of which they take shape provide a comprehensive context within which its members make choices.** 10 Let me focus this view by reference to a historical example. Cultural nationalists (of various sorts) in the era of black power argued that African Americans have a specific cultural inheritance. We are African. We have a value system that in spite of the “perceived” rupture of the transatlantic slave trade continues to distinguish us from Europeans and animate our choices. **If these values fail to inform our actions, at least on a conscious level, the failure only indicates the effects of white supremacy: we have been robbed of our cultural inheritance. Our aim, then, should be to reconstruct, as best as we can, a form of life that reflects the true way of being African in the world**. Maulana Karenga, founder of the Us organization, developed an elaborate cultural theory of blackness, which he called Kawaida theory. Karenga argued that, through a complex set of ritual practices, African Americans could reconnect with their past— with a proper way of being African in the world— and that this reconnection would facilitate both healthier relationships with others and a more revolutionary politics. Karenga’s view was only one expression of a position that informed numerous political projects of the period. **Many believed that African American freedom required a revolution of black minds. Black individuals needed to remove the psychological chains of white supremacy and embrace a consciousness that reflected a more authentic way of being in the world**— a world, as Karenga was fond of saying, in which blackness would become our ultimate reality. This position assumed what can be called an expressivist conception of the racial self. **For Karenga and many others, African Americans were self-determining agents primarily because there was something unique about them as black people. This uniqueness determined their relations with “others” and defined their obligations to the race**. If a black individual failed to connect with this inner something and with those similarly situated, she would fail in effect to live the life that is uniquely hers. The same was true for African Americans in general. If black people in the United States failed to embrace their cultural inheritance— their unique form of life— then they would fail to live in a way that was truly theirs. From Martin Delany to Marcus Garvey, such views of identity have informed political action. In some significant ways, this view— which assumes that despite many differences black Americans share a sense of who black people are, and that a set of concomitant beliefs is sufficient to settle most problems that they confront— continues to be a powerful force in our political and cultural imaginations. Advocates of Afrocentrism, for example, hold that most of the problems that confront African Americans would be resolved if we only lived an authentically African life or, as Molefe Asante would say, a properly centered existence. 11 My intuition is that most arguments seeking to debunk black identity talk as hokum in fact reflect deep disagreements with this particular formulation of black identity and the politics that support it. **According to this archeological approach, black identity is concerned with uncovering our true selves and inferring from that discovery what we must do. Black identity is interpreted here in terms of reality and appearance. There is a real way of being black and a false way. Something out there is essentially black, and when we lose our way, as some of us have as result of white supremacy, we need only find “it” and all will be well.** I should not be too glib. The impulse underlying this approach does have roots in the experience of white supremacy. Frantz Fanon, writing in the context of colonial struggles, located the reasons for this approach in “passionate research directed by the secret hope of discovering beyond the misery of today, beyond self-contempt, resignation and abjuration, some very beautiful and splendid era whose existence rehabilitates us both in regard to ourselves and others.” 12 Thus archeological projects often entail constructing monumental histories, which answer a psychological need to respond to collective humiliation, to lash back and not accept certain conditions of living. The conception of the self informing these projects is often fixed, an unchanging reference for deliberation. **Given this premise, either one acts like a true black person— one who understands who she is— or one doesn’t. It is not really possible to experience genuine conflict or uncertainty about how one should act as a black person; all the distinctions have already been made**. **A problem arises, however, when we postulate one single factor— the racial self— as an explanation for the moral lives of black people. The uncertainty and conflict that are characteristic of any situation properly called moral are obscured. The complexity that marks, for example, political decision making is reduced to a simple question of fidelity to one’s cultural inheritance**: will one be authentically black or an Uncle Tom? **Problems may involve issues of gender, class, sexuality, religious preference, geographic difference, or the difficulties of falling in love, but all can be resolved by an appeal to the good and to the notions of obligation that flow from an authentic way of being black in the world. Such simplifications of problematic situations reflect— and promote— a loss of the capacity to discriminate and to make delicate distinctions**. **The fact that we are often unsure of the right and just approach, and ignorant of the consequences of our actions, is lost.** Moreover, our individuality is compromised as this idea of black identity, as Kwame Anthony Appiah rightly worries, “goes imperial” and implicates itself in cases where judgments and choices should instead be made with an eye to the particular forces impinging on us at the time. My position should not, however, be seen as similar to the views put forward by someone like John McWhorter, whom I mention only as a kind of stand-in for a lay position that seeks, however clumsily, a different way of understanding the complexity of contemporary identity talk and black politics. McWhorter, in particular, takes issue with conceptions of blackness that constrain black individuality and limit our capacity to describe the complexity of the lives of African Americans. He insists that **much of race talk among African Americans today trades on a culture of defeatism in which ideas of victimology and anti-intellectualism, along with a “questionable” leadership class, obscure the actual lives of black individuals**. 13 In his view, race no longer stands as the explanatory category of the situation of African Americans. Instead, he appeals to a vibrant American tradition of self-help and moral perfectionism that accounts for the kinds of lives we want to lead and should lead in terms of our individual choices and efforts. Once we rid ourselves of bad ways of thinking about race and black identity, McWhorter maintains, we can embrace a “deracialized” paradigm of living. He never quite says what this might look like— perhaps a naïve version of humanism. **Responding with cries of “race traitor” or “neocon shill” will not get us far toward determining the stakes of the argument.** McWhorter rightly notes that our moment demands we show greater discernment when using race to talk about problems confronting black individuals. However, he overstates his case when he claims that race language and appeals to black identity function principally as tools of victimology. **This view reveals an all-or-nothing approach to the category: either such appeals capture fully the experiences of African Americans or they are mere fictions, doing more harm than good.**

#### The assumptions of the Affirmative mask over the actual doing and sufferings of African Americans- As a result they are in a double-bind: Either they theorize African-American Experience as universalizeable, which is problematic or they cannot create the actual politics necessary to solve

**Glaude 2007 (Eddie, Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton, *In a Shade of Blue,* 50-51)**

I have tried to show, **on pragmatic grounds**, that **there are ways to imagine “us” without falling into the trap of racial essentialism** or succumbing to what Adolph Reed rightly decries as a misguided view of corporate racial interests. **My aim has been to turn our attention to the actual “doings and sufferings” of black folk. There we find richly textured experiences that trouble any reductive account of the lives of African Americans. Time and again, appeals to racial identity and unity, or to notions of black history and agency, have masked, often to the detriment of the most vulnerable, the competing interests informing the political and moral choices of African Americans. Competing interests are ignored in favor of a form of racial politics that presumes, dangerously, that black individuals see themselves as necessarily in solidarity with other black individuals solely on the basis of race. This assumption, more often than not, results in a form of racial politics that relies heavily on a set of tropes that signal to those willing to listen that black interests, whatever they may be, are in jeopardy.** We need only invoke the images of our past, or the many persons who gave their lives in the struggle for black freedom, to orient ourselves appropriately to any political matter. **For some, these tropes stand in for democratic deliberation; they, in effect, do our thinking for us. But such invocations blind us to a crucial insight: that democratic and participatory value must be the cornerstone of credibility for the notion of black politics; group consensus must be constructed through active participation. Even then, it is important to realize that often there will be no universal racial consensus on key issues; that some conflicts derive from irreconcilable material differences. Unity is always on specific terms and in pursuit of specific objectives.**

**---maybe read-depends on debate-ron, says it gets you no wherbut if debate calls for it, read it----African Americans are willing and able to engage and modify civil society by incorporating the struggles of the blues, no need to shift to Jazz**

**Glaude 2007 (Eddie, Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton, *In a Shade of Blue,* 50-51)**

**What I experienced throughout black America over the course of the tour was an extraordinary expression of civic energy, something very unusual in these dark political times.** **To be sure, we have witnessed over the past few decades a civic power outage in our country.** Many of our fellow citizens are too busy trying to make ends meet or too preoccupied with their own selfish pursuits to engage in public matters. Moreover, moralists who are seemingly not committed to the democratic virtues of open and free exchange have sought to hijack American public life. They want to cultivate instead a pernicious provinciality that results not in the formation of democratic character but in blind dogmatism. I am reminded of the powerful words of William James: “A mind too narrow has room but for one kind of affection.” This one kind of affection is often wrapped in the garments of piety. But as James says, “Piety is the mask, the inner force is tribal instinct.” 5 **These realities should not lead us to retreat into separatist enclaves. Instead, those of us, few though we may be, must find the energy to draw on the resources of this powerful but fragile experiment in democracy, to save our country.** The words of Ralph Waldo Emerson come to mind: **The existing world is not a dream, and cannot with impunity be treated as a dream; neither is it a disease; but it is the ground on which you stand, it is the mother of whom you were born. Reform converses with possibilities, perchance with impossibilities; but here is sacred fact. This was also true, or it could not be: it had life in it, or it could not have existed; it has life in it, or it could not continue. 6 We must believe, not in a naïve way, that our nation has life in it**. The Covenant with Black America demonstrates that this is so and**, in our current moment**, constitutes a space where democratic hope can be found. The Covenant with Black America **stands within a particular tradition of struggle, a struggle of a blues people who found resources for democratic hope in the extraordinary capacities of ordinary people in spite of a wicked nation committed to wicked practices. The ideals of democracy inspired those who had been denied freedom and education to dream dreams, to imagine possibilities, and to hold on in the face of the withering storm— to will themselves into a new day. This tradition never believed the lie that this country was an example of democracy achieved but, rather, understood intimately its failures and shortcomings, its blindnesses and deformities. This tradition saw nevertheless not simply disease but possibility**— understanding that the nation could have life if it would only learn to swing Duke Ellington style. It is a tradition that, at its best, cultivated democratic dispositions in the face of strange fruit dangling from poplar trees, insisted on effective freedom as African Americans imagined a day that their children and children’s children would be able to actualize their capacities and potentialities, and struggled to ensure that every child would have access to the opportunity and skills to make good on the promise that is America**. It is in these dark and trying times that we must turn to the power of Emerson’s insight and the enduring purchase of traditions of struggle to muster the democratic hope and courage to challenge our nation and insist on a better future** for our children— to educate them and ourselves into the habits of democracy so that this nation can be saved. I am convinced that the Covenant provides such an occasion— one not mired in the nostalgic longing of a glorious past but, rather, one that looks into a distant future to ensure a better life for those yet unborn.

### Cap Link – Post Colonialism Bad

#### Do not be seducted by the aff’s call to listen --- we could all do a better job at listening, including myself, but listening cannot be an end in and of itself --- focus on mere narration is extremely problematic --- it denies agency and becomes self-destructive victimization --- Postcolonial reduction to otherness masks root causes and depoliticizes current movements

Almond ’12 Ian Almond teaches mostly in the area of South Asian and postcolonial literature and theory. He received his degrees from the British universities of Warwick and Edinburgh and has spent most of his academic life outside his home country, teaching at universities in Italy and Germany and spending a research year in India. He lived for six years in Turkey, teaching at universities both in and outside Istanbul.¶ He is the author of four books: Sufism and Deconstruction (Routledge, 2004), The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam (I.B.Tauris, 2007), Two Faiths, One Banner (Harvard University Press/ I. B. Tauris, 2009) and History of Islam in German Thought From Leibniz to Nietzsche (Routledge, 2009). ¶ He has also published a number of articles in journals such as PMLA, New Literary History, ELH, Harvard Theological Review, and the left-wing UK journal Radical Philosophy. ariel: a review of international english literature¶ ISSN 0004-1327 Vol. 43 No. 1 Pages 1–21 Copyright © 2012 Anti-Capitalist Objections to the¶ Postcolonial:¶ Some Conciliatory¶ Remarks on Žižek and Context, online, jj

Žižek maintains three objections to the postcolonial.¶ The first concerns¶ an alleged postcolonial¶ reduction of material and economic problems¶ to issues of otherness and tolerance, a perceived psychologising of¶ real political problems which ultimately distracts from more concrete,¶ less palatable explanations of oppression:¶ The problem of postcolonialism¶ is undoubtedly crucial; however,¶ postcolonial¶ studies tends to translate it into the multiculturalist¶ problematic of the colonized minorities’ right to narrate¶ their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms that repress¶ otherness, so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the¶ root of postcolonial¶ exploitation is our intolerance toward the¶ Other and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in¶ our intolerance toward the “Stranger in Ourselves,” in our inability¶ to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. The¶ politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed¶ into a pseudopsychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to¶ confront its inner traumas. (Žižek, “A Plea” 545–46)¶ Žižek’s charge contains a great deal of truth. It is probably a redundant¶ gesture to chide him for an ignorance of the bitter family quarrels within¶ postcolonial¶ theory over the years, which could almost merit its division¶ into two schools of thought: one capital-friendly, the other decidedly¶ hostile. Bringing Levinasian examinations of otherness to a situation¶ such as the Israeli-Palestine conflict or the L.A. riots of 1993 certainly¶ runs the risk of de-politicization, if de-politicization means the non-consideration¶ of any material or economic factors (e.g., military superiority, levels of unemployment) which might implicate democratic capitalism¶ as a cause of these conflicts. Thus Žižek’s 2002 argument in favour of a¶ “proper dose of economic reductionism” in considering Islam’s relations¶ with the West is a valid response to what he perceives as the postcolonial¶ overemphasis on the psychoanalytical/metaphysical framework of the¶ West’s discourses on the Islamic Other (Welcome to the Desert 44). That¶ Žižek adopts positions in later texts (such as On Violence) that seriously¶ compromise this stance will be examined in a moment. More immediately,¶ the question arises of how Žižek, as a Lacanian political theorist,¶ is able to evaluate the perceived postcolonial¶ shift in emphasis from a¶ real “politico-economic struggle” into a “pseudopsychoanalytic drama.”¶ Žižek’s commitment to a Lacanian perception of reality as always “overdetermined¶ by the symbolic texture within which it appears” (Butler,¶ Laclau, and Žižek 220) is a central problem in his evaluation. Žižek’s¶ belief that “our knowing of reality is embedded in reality itself ” (Žižek,¶ The Parallax View 28) problematizes his condemnation of the postcolonial¶ for privileging one strand of the symbolic texture over another.¶ If our perception of “politico-economic” circumstances is every bit as¶ embedded in the symbolic fabric of reality as “pseudopsychoanalytical”¶ explanations, then why is discussing nineteenth-century European¶ images of the tribal any more misleading than reporting the activities of¶ mining corporations in West Bengal?

#### The aff’s post-colonial epistemology reduces fundamentally economic antagonisms to questions of “otherness” --- this results in endless narration of victimization that cements capitalism

Slavoj Zizek, Critical Inquiry¶ Winter 2002¶ A Plea for Leninist Intolerance <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-plea.htm>

One is therefore tempted to turn around Marx's eleventh thesis: the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to directly intervene and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul de sac of debilitating impossibility, leaving one to ask, What can one do against global capital?) but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. If, today, one follows a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space; it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates: those who "really want to do something to help people" get involved in (undoubtedly honorable) exploits like Doctors without Borders, Greenpeace, feminist and antiracist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly enter economic territory (say, denouncing and boycotting companies that do not respect ecological conditions or that use child labor). They are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. Let us take two predominant topics from today's American radical academia, postcolonial and queer studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, postcolonial studies tends to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' right to narrate their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms that repress otherness, so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. Thus the politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas. The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included, up to a point), but conceptual: notions of European critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of cultural studies chic. With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise; they, at least, play their game in a straight way and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates in contrast to the pseudoradical academic leftists who adopt the attitude of utter disdain toward the Third Way, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture that obliges no one to anything determinate.

#### Narritivization of politics fracture movements against capitalism – the aff’s specific application of narrative knowledge in the struggle against Western rationality ignores the commonality of oppression makes divide and conquer tactics more effective

Smith ’95(Sharon, columnist for Socialist Worker and author of Women’s Liberation and Socialism, Mistaken Identity: or Can Identity Politics Liberate the Oppressed, http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj62/smith.htm)

Among many people on the left today the Marxist emphasis on the centrality of class and class struggle – as key both to understanding and to transforming society – is widely disparaged. Many who once looked to the working class movement as key to social change have shifted their focus toward the 'new social movements'. This term covers a broad range of movements which originated in the 1960s and 1970s, including those against the oppression of women, blacks and lesbians and gays, as well as those organized around ecology, disarmament and a variety of other issues. Key to this strategy for social change, which has been carried to its logical extreme more recently through the development of 'identity politics,' is the idea that only those experiencing a particular form of oppression can either define it or fight against it. For people newly active on the left, this way of organizing may seem like common sense: it should go without saying that those who are oppressed should fight against their own oppression. Moreover, the prevalence of sexist, racist and anti-gay ideas in society at large makes it sometimes appear as if the bigotry which divides people can never be fully overcome. This pessimistic notion forms the theoretical basis for identity politics. It is assumed that a particular movement must include only those who face a specific form of oppression. To one degree or another, all the other people in society are part of the problem – in some way they benefit from oppression and have an interest in maintaining it. For this same reason it follows that each oppressed group should have its own distinct and separate movement. Such movements therefore tend to be organized on the basis of 'autonomy' or independence – from each other and from the socialist movement. They tend also to be organized independent of any class basis. But this logic is flawed. It would be disastrous, for example, if the fight against fascism in Europe today were limited to only members of those racial groups who are immediately targeted by fascists. The advance of the fascist movement is not only a threat to 'foreign born' workers, but to all workers. To most effectively counter the recent rise of fascists in Europe, all those who oppose the far right, whatever race they happen to be, should be encouraged to join the anti-fascist movement. Any fight against oppression, if it is to succeed, must be based upon building the strongest possible movement. And that can only happen when a movement unites different groups of activists into a common struggle. It is not, as is widely assumed within these political milieu, necessary to face a particular oppression in order to fight against that oppression, any more than it is necessary to be destitute in order to fight against poverty. Many people who do not experience a particular form of oppression can learn to identify with those who do, and can be enlisted as allies in a common struggle. The politics of identity cannot point the way towards building the kind of movement which can actually end oppression. In fact, among existing organizations founded on the basis of identity politics, the tendency has been towards fragmentation and disintegration, rather than growth. More often than not among movements organized on the basis of identity politics the enemy includes 'everyone else' – perceived as an amorphous, backward blob which makes up the rest of society. Instead of seeing the class struggle as a way to overcome oppression, the working class is seen as a barrier to this process. At its heart, identity politics is a rejection of the notion that the working class can be the agent for social change, and a pessimism about the possibility for significant, never mind revolutionary, social transformation. As Stanley Aronowitz argued in his book, The Politics of Identity: *Class, Culture, Social Movements*: ...the historically exclusive focus of class-based movements on a narrow definition of the issues of economic justice has frequently excluded gender, race, and qualitative issues, questions of workers' control over production, and similar problems. The almost exclusive emphasis on narrow quantitative issues has narrowed the political base of labor and socialist movements and made all but inevitable the emergence of social movements which, as often as not, perceived class politics as inimical to their aims.1

#### Postcolonial studies have flawed understanding of the Other – derails capitalist struggles and allows movements to be coopted (link/turns case)

Almond ’12 Ian Almond teaches mostly in the area of South Asian and postcolonial literature and theory. He received his degrees from the British universities of Warwick and Edinburgh and has spent most of his academic life outside his home country, teaching at universities in Italy and Germany and spending a research year in India. He lived for six years in Turkey, teaching at universities both in and outside Istanbul.¶ He is the author of four books: Sufism and Deconstruction (Routledge, 2004), The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam (I.B.Tauris, 2007), Two Faiths, One Banner (Harvard University Press/ I. B. Tauris, 2009) and History of Islam in German Thought From Leibniz to Nietzsche (Routledge, 2009). ¶ He has also published a number of articles in journals such as PMLA, New Literary History, ELH, Harvard Theological Review, and the left-wing UK journal Radical Philosophy. ariel: a review of international english literature¶ ISSN 0004-1327 Vol. 43 No. 1 Pages 1–21 Copyright © 2012 Anti-Capitalist Objections to the¶ Postcolonial:¶ Some Conciliatory¶ Remarks on Žižek and Context, online, jj

Žižek’s second objection to the postcolonial¶ concerns respect for the¶ Other which, ultimately, leads to a de-traumatization or “ethical prettification”¶ of the Other (In Defence 165). Žižek foregrounds those deconstructive/¶ Levinasian elements in postcolonial¶ theory which insist upon¶ a respect for a foreigner’s alterity, and he re-describes them as a vocabulary¶ of naiveté, a “de-caffeination” of the Other, precisely because such a¶ view overlooks “the neighbour as the bearer of a monstrous Otherness”¶ (On Violence 49; Parallax 113). In other words, the postcolonial¶ objection¶ to the demonization of the Other fails to glimpse—or does¶ not wish to face—what is radically inhuman not simply in the Other¶ but in us all. According to Žižek, this multicultural/liberal temerity in¶ the face of the Real allows it to be easily co-opted by the democratic¶ capitalist symbolic order, a collusion (this postcolonial¶ deification of¶ Otherness) that ensures a thorough de-radicalisation of the political,¶ emphasizes peaceful capitalist multicultural harmony instead of radical¶ anti-colonial justice, and signals an unwillingness to contemplate¶ the truly monstrous in the Other that will always thwart projects of¶ radical action. In one of the few moments where Žižek demonstrates an¶ awareness of postcolonialism’s¶ internal tensions, he cites Frantz Fanon’s¶ well-known affirmation of violent action as provoking “uneasiness [in]¶ ‘radical’ post-colonialist Afro-American studies” (Žižek, Ticklish Subject¶ 244). For Žižek, the postcolonial¶ lubricates late capitalism not merely¶ through its reduction of political/economic conflicts to “pseudopsychoanalysis,”¶ but also in its avoidance of the Real in the Other—ultimately, an avoidance of Lacan’s call to take on, in all its aspects, the impossible¶ task of symbolizing the Real.

### Hurt race

***Marxism isn’t blind to race – we’re the most effective way to challenge oppression***

**Taylor 11** [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, on the editorial board of the International Socialist Review and a doctoral student in African American Studies at Northwestern University; “Race, class and Marxism,” SocialistWorker.org, <http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism>]

Marxists believe that the potential for that kind of unity is dependant on battles and struggles against racism today. Without a commitment by revolutionary organizations in the here and now to the fight against racism, working-class unity will never be achieved and the revolutionary potential of the working class will never be realized. Yet despite all the evidence of this commitment to fighting racism over many decades, Marxism has been maligned as, at best, "blind" to combating racism and, at worst, "incapable" of it. For example, in an article published last summer, popular commentator and self-described "anti-racist" Tim Wise summarized the critique of "left activists" that he later defines as Marxists. He writes: [L]eft activists often marginalize people of color by operating from a framework of extreme class reductionism, which holds that the "real" issue is class, not race, that "the only color that matters is green," and that issues like racism are mere "identity politics," which should take a backseat to promoting class-based universalism and programs to help working people. This reductionism, by ignoring the way that even middle class and affluent people of color face racism and color-based discrimination (and by presuming that low-income folks of color and low-income whites are equally oppressed, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary) reinforces white denial, privileges white perspectivism and dismisses the lived reality of people of color. Even more, as we'll see, it ignores perhaps the most important political lesson regarding the interplay of race and class: namely, that the biggest reason why there is so little working-class consciousness and unity in the Untied States (and thus, why class-based programs to uplift all in need are so much weaker here than in the rest of the industrialized world), is precisely because of racism and the way that white racism has been deliberately inculcated among white working folks. Only by confronting that directly (rather than sidestepping it as class reductionists seek to do) can we ever hope to build cross-racial, class based coalitions. In other words, for the policies favored by the class reductionist to work--be they social democrats or Marxists--or even to come into being, racism and white supremacy must be challenged directly. Here, Wise accuses Marxism of: "extreme class reductionism," meaning that Marxists allegedly think that class is more important than race; **reducing struggles against racism to "mere identity politics**"; and requiring that struggles against racism should "take a back seat" to struggles over economic issues. Wise also accuses so-called "left activists" of reinforcing "white denial" and "dismiss[ing] the lived reality of people of color"--which, of course, presumes Left activists and Marxists to all be white. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - What do Marxists actually say? Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that **under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn**. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. **To claim**, as Marxists do, **that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny** or diminish **its importance** or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that ***oppressions*** can reinforce and compound each other, they ***are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation*** that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies. Despite the widespread beliefs to the contrary of his critics, Karl Marx himself was well aware of the centrality of race under capitalism. While Marx did not write extensively on the question of slavery and its racial impact in societies specifically, he did write about the way in which European capitalism emerged because of its pilfering, rape and destruction, famously writing: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of Black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. He also recognized the extent to which slavery was central to the world economy. He wrote: Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy--the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations. Thus slavery, because it is an economic category, has always existed among the institutions of the peoples. Modern nations have been able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise upon the New World. Thus, there is a fundamental understanding of the centrality of slave labor in the national and international economy. But what about race? Despite the dearth of Marx's own writing on race in particular, one might look at Marx's correspondence and deliberations on the American Civil War to draw conclusions as to whether Marx was as dogmatically focused on purely economic issues as his critics make him out be. One must raise the question: If Marx was reductionist, how is his unabashed support and involvement in abolitionist struggles in England explained? If Marx was truly an economic reductionist, he might have surmised that slavery and capitalism were incompatible, and simply waited for slavery to whither away. W.E.B. Du Bois in his Marxist tome Black Reconstruction, quotes at length a letter penned by Marx as the head of the International Workingmen's Association, written to Abraham Lincoln in 1864 in the midst of the Civil War: The contest for the territories which opened the epoch, was it not to decide whether the virgin soil of immense tracts should be wedded to the labor of the immigrant or be prostituted by the tramp of the slaver driver? When an oligarchy of 300,000 slave holders dared to inscribe for the first time in the annals of the world "Slavery" on the banner of armed revolt, when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one great Democratic Republic had first sprung up, whence the first declaration of the rights of man was issued...when on the very spots counter-revolution...maintained "slavery to be a beneficial institution"...and cynically proclaimed property in man 'the cornerstone of the new edifice'...then the working classes of Europe understood at once...that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy war of property against labor... They consider it an earnest sign of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggles for the rescue of the enchained race and the Reconstruction of a social order. Not only was Marx personally opposed to slavery and actively organized against it, but he theorized that slavery and the resultant race discrimination that flowed from it were not just problems for the slaves themselves, but for white workers who were constantly under the threat of losing work to slave labor. This did not mean white workers were necessarily sympathetic to the cause of the slaves--most of them were not. But Marx was not addressing the issue of consciousness, but objective factors when he wrote in Capital, "In the United States of America, every independent movement of the workers was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the Black it is branded." Moreover, Marx understood the dynamics of racism in a modern sense as well--as a means by which workers who had common, objective interests with each other could also become mortal enemies because of subjective, but nevertheless real, racist and nationalist ideas. Looking at the tensions between Irish and English workers, with a nod toward the American situation between Black and white workers, Marx wrote: Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude is much the same as that of the "poor whites" to the "niggers" in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it. Out of this quote, one can see a Marxist theory of how racism operated in contemporary society, after slavery was ended. Marx was highlighting three things: first, that capitalism promotes economic competition between workers; second, that the ruling class uses racist ideology to divide workers against each other; and finally, that when one group of workers suffer oppression, it negatively impacts the entire class.

#### Particular impossible

#### They cannot win uniqueness – Capital will constantly annihilate the particular

**Dean,** Associate Professor of Political Theory at Hobart & William Smith, **2005**

Jodi, Zizek against Democracy, jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/files/zizek\_against\_ democracy\_new\_version.doc –

To summarize: Zizek argues that the democratic form runs up against a stain or non-universalizable kernel. Using Lacan, he understands this kernel as a stain of enjoyment, of an irreducible attachment to an intense pleasure-pain. The empty place of democracy is never fully empty. It comes up against points of non-universalizability—founding violence, ethnic particularity, the national Thing. Indeed, insofar as democracy has been a project of the Nation, its very starting point, its position of enunciation, requires this non-universalizable kernel. To the extent that liberal democracy tries to eliminate this stain, tries to exclude ethic fundamentalism and nationalist attachment, it necessarily fails. And, under conditions of late capitalism, the problem is even worse. Like liberal democracy, Capital wants to eliminate particular attachments. Liberal-democratic attacks on ethnic fundamentalism, then, serve capitalist ends at they attack some of the few remaining sites of opposition to capitalism. Nationalist, ethnic, racist violence thus persists today at the intersection of two modes of failed universalization—democracy and capitalism. The question is whether a new political universality is possible.

#### Universality does not exclude the other – it erases the existing edifice of domination

**Zizek in 2000** Slavoj Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, page 217

Here, again, I think it is crucial also to emphasis the *opposite* aspect: what universality excludes is not primarily the underprivileged Other whose status is reduced, constrained, and so on, but *its own* permanent founding gesture – a set of unwritten, unacknowledged rules and practices which, well publicly disavowed, are none the less the ultimate support of the existing power edifice. The public power edifice is haunted also by its own disavowed particular obscene underside, by the particular practices which *break its own public rules* – in short, by its ‘inherent transgression’.

### K – Link

#### The affirmative radically depoliticizes the economy - this can never obtain the dimensions of universality because it precludes acts of authentic politics

**Zizek, ’99** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

**The big news of today’s post-political age** of the ‘end of ideology’ **is** thus **the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy:** the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, **as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of** religious, sexual, ethnic and other **way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made.** In short, **the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom,** the subordinated of the process of production to social control – **the radical** repoliticization of the economy.That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s **post-politics cannot attain** the properly political dimension of **universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization.** The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: **all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues** (gay rights, **ecology,** ethnic minorities…), **all this incessant activity** of fluid, shifting identities, **of building multiple** ad hoc **coalitions,** and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and **ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what** really matters **– will** not **be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized.** 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, **it is much more crucial to focus on what** remains the same **in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital.** The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### Identity politics makes the realization of a true universal impossible

**Zizek, ’09** (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, professor at the European Graduate School, and total BAMF, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, p. 102, bgm)

Liberals who acknowledge the problems of those excluded from the socio-political process formulate their goal as being the inclusion of those whose voices are not heard: all positions should be listened to, all interests taken into account, the human rights of everyone guaranteed, all ways of life, cultures, and practices respected, and so on. The obsession of this democratic discourse is the protection of all kinds of minorities: cultural, religious, sexual, *e tutti quanti*. The formula of democracy is patient negotiation and compromise. What gets lost here is the proletarian position, the position of universality embodied in the Excluded. This is why, upon a closer look, it becomes clear that what Hugo Chavez has begun doing in Venezuela differs markedly from the standard liberal form of inclusion: Chavez is not including the “excluded” dwellers of favelas as his *base* and then reorganizing political space and political forms so that the latter will “fit” the excluded. Pedantic and abstract as it may appear, this difference—between “bourgeois democracy” and “dictatorship of the proletariat” —is crucial.

#### The affirmative cedes the universal

Perm links to our ethics disad and get’s co-opted – cedes the universal

The plan’s political interpassivity --- all their cede the political args link harder to them --- they’re not about political change, the purpose of the aff is to provide ample energy supplies so that underlying economic structures don’t have to be changed

**Valentić 07** (Tonči, University of Zagreb, “Socialism reconsidered: Remarks on Žižek`s *Repeating Lenin”,* International Journal of Zizek Studies, <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/47/92>)

Žižek`s assertion that the main failure of today's Left is the acceptance of the cultural wars (such as anti-racist or feminist) as the dominant terrain of the emancipatory politics is very easy to defend. There are basically two possible ways for the socio-political engagement: either to play the game of the system, i.e. to engage in the "long march through the institutions" or to get active in new social movements(such as feminism, ecology, antiracism, minority rights, etc.). Žižek rejects both of them, being mainly negative towards the second since they are not political in a strict sense of the word: they are not more that "single issue movements" with the lack of social totality, focused only on one group of people or one single social issue, thus rejecting the universalism as an important part of any struggle in the public sphere. Instead of a "right to narrate" one personal story or story from one particular point of viewof the so-called socially deprived groups, he emphasizes the "right to truth" as embodied in historical figure of St. Paul, calling on the traces of Alain Badiou for humanity beyond particular disintegration or abstract humanism, beyond pathetic brotherhood, instead based on the "politics of truth". He puts into play the role of Saint Paul because in the realm of political theology he aimed to ground a new collective that abandons and leaves behind both the "Roman" and "Jewish" way, i.e. false universalism of liberal democracy's discourse and orthodox right-wing fundamentalism. With his assertion of today's world seen as period of post-modern relativism where we should articulate the universal truth as prerequisite for emancipatory politics, he overwrites the Leninist notion of "politics of truth" claiming it still has to be reinvented and implied. Since Badoiu`s notion of Event tends to "emerge out of nowhere", the same goes for Leninism as radical gesture: it is the only way to cope with contemporary totalitarian liberal democracy, so this reference to Lenin serves as an effort to break the vicious circle of these false options, i.e. either to play the game in hope you can one day beat the system or to fight the system emphasizing social particularities. The statement is very clear and convincing: partial emancipation is possible only through universal emancipation, which means particular experience cannot be universalized and therefore denotes a conservative political gesture, such as an emphasis on minority rights, gay and lesbian organizations, etc. Žižek`s critical remarks on the contemporary dominant fetish of repressed "otherness" as well as a concept of social intolerance towards the Other become the battlefield for analysis of Other's intolerance towards us, which is not politically correct but is politically true. Just as radicalism often represents an empty gesture, by the same token it is also the case with the political correctness as well as fascination with victimized Other, which leads us to the new type of exclusion, the exclusion of those who do not play by those imposed rules and are a priori considered terrorists or oppressors if they belong to the majority group (for example, single white Anglo-American male in today's United States in contrast to black lesbian woman). The important step, or to put it more clearly, the main theoretical act, is precisely to define hegemonic ideological coordinates because if you act you are already in the game, playing by the rules. Regarding political Denkverbot mentioned before, Žižek humorously but nonetheless punctually paraphrases Max Horkheimer`s sentence "those who do not want to talk about fascism, should keep silent about capitalism" into "those who do not want to talk about global capitalism, should keep silent about socialism". Political activity is here accurately seen as an example of political interpassivity, i.e. doing things not to achieve something, but to prevent something from really changing, as in an unmentioned reference to famous Visconti`s phrase in one of his movies that "everything has to be changed in order to remain the same". The Return to Lenin has a quite different aim. Instead of playing the role of leftist intellectual who pretends to be critical towards capitalism discussing the transition from commodity fetishism to fetishism which is today itself commodified or to support the naïve belief in cyber communism as the possible way of resistance, he calls for repetition of Lenin's historical gesture with the famous question, once more brought into the intellectual debate: "Čto djelat?" or "What Is To Be Done?" Here it is crucial to emphasize the relevance of so called "high theory" today for the most concrete political struggle – as we remember from socialism, theoretical knowledge is not unimportant; quite contrary, as Žižek argues, it is the main incentive for the revolutionary act which follows it. Another author who uses Lenin as a crucial figure is Toni Negri (article "What to do with "What to do?" Or rather: The body of General Intellect"), who grippingly emphasized the biopolitical aspect of Leninism, (Lenin beyond Lenin), i.e. interpreting communist struggle as inevitably biopolitical struggle. Since the present ideologico-political constellation is characterized by the tendency to introduce moralistic reasoning into the political struggle, we are only a few steps away from a teleological explanation of liberal-democratic capitalism as the ultimate and eternal social order. The true problem with the democracy as *liberal* democracy is in its inherent paradox, since it is possible only in the conditions of its impossibility, and the major problem with the state from the socialist point of view is that it has always been seen as an instrument of oppression which can never be fully democratized. For that reason, socialist interventions pinpoint the dominant role of the state as well as democracy's insufficiencies.

#### Focusing on the positionality of race papers over capitalism

**hooks 2K** (bell, prof of English city college, where we stand: class matters page 5-6)

Racial solidarity, particularly the solidarity of whiteness, has historically always been used to obscure class, to make the white poor see their interests as one with the world of white privilege. Similarly, the black poor have always been told that class can never matter as much as race. Nowadays the black and white poor know better. They are not so easily duped by an appeal to unquestioned racial identification and solidarity, but they are still uncertain about what all the changes mean; they are uncertain about where they stand. This uncertainty is shared by those who are not poor, but who could be poor tomorrow if jobs are lost. They, too, are afraid to say how much class matters. While the poor are offered addiction as a way to escape thinking too much, working people are encouraged to shop. Consumer culture silences working people and the middle classes. They are busy buying or planning to buy. Although their frag-ile hold on economic self-sufficiency is slipping, they still cling to the dream of a class-free society where everyone can make it to the top. They are afraid to face the significance of dwindling resources, the high cost of education, housing, and health care. They are afraid to think too deeply about class.

#### The affirmative’s construction of “blackness” as a legitimate way to frame social relations de-politicizes the capitalist underbelly of American Pedagogy. Their 1AC serves to make exclusion inevitable by upholding race as an analytic category while attempting to deconstruct social relations of difference.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

**There has been a tendency in postmodern and post-structuralist views of the anti-racism project and “race relations” to neglect or ignore profound changes in the structural nature and dynamics of U.S. capitalism, in** place of obvious or common sense appraisals of **racialized inequality.** This same tendency is also evident in much of the recent scholarship on cultural politics and social difference. **At a time when** a historical materialist **linguistic** **questions tied to academic achievement. This is illustrated by the large body of education literature that focuses on the cultural difference of “language minority” student, while only marginally discussing the impact of racialized inequality and class position on identity and cultural formations**, **as if somehow the problems of African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and other student from subordinate cultural populations can be resolved simply through the introduction of culturally relevant curriculum** or the enactment of language policy. Moreover, **it is this limited view of the problem that most informs the recent political debates between supporters of bilingual education and California‘s Proposition 227** (also known as the Unz Initiative or English for the Children). As Morrison implies**, unproblematized “common sense” acceptance and use of “race” as a legitimate way to frame social relations has been highly prevalent in the social sciences**. The use of this term, for example, among Chicano scholars in the 1960s can be linked to academic acts of resistance to the term “ethnicity” and theories of assimilation which were generally applied to discuss immigration populations of European decent. In efforts to distance Chicano scholarship from this definition and link it to a theory of internal colonialism, cultural imperialism, and racism, **Chicanos were discussed as a colonized “racial” group in much the same manner that many radical theorists positioned African Americans**. Consequently, **the term’s association with power, resistance, and self-determination has veiled the problematics of “race” as a social construct**. Protected by the force of cultural nationalist rhetoric, **“race” as an analytical term has remained a “paper tiger” – seemingly powerful in discourse matters but ineffectual as an analytical metaphor, incapable of moving us away from the pervasive notion of “race” as an innate determinant of behavior**. **In these times, we would be hard-pressed to find a progressive scholar who would subscribe to the use of “race” as a determinant of specific social phenomena associated with inherent** (on genetic**) characteristics of a group. Yet the use of “race” as an analytical category continues to maintain a stronghold in both academic and popular discourse. What does it mean to** **attribute analytical status to the idea of “race” and use it as an explanatory concept in theoretical discussion? The use of “race” as an analytical category means to position it as a central organizing theoretical principal in deconstructing social relations of difference, as these pertain to subordinate cultural populations**. Notwithstanding provocative arguments by left theorists such as Adolph Reed Jr., who unequivocally assert that “Race is purely a social construction; it has no core reality outside a specific social and historical context…its material force derives from state power, not some ahistorical ‘nature’ of any sort of primordial group affinities,” there is an unwillingness to abandon its use. Yet, **it is this persistent use of “Race” in the literature and research on African Americans, Latinos, and other culturally subordinate populations that perpetuates its definition as a causal factor.** As such**, the notion of “race” as a social construction “only leads us back into the now familiar move of substituting a sociohistorical conception of race for the biological one…that is simple to bury the biological conception below the surface, not to transcend it.” Hence, significance and meaning are still attributed to phenotypical features, rather than to the historically reproduced complex processes of racialization. This ultimately serves to conceal the particular set of social conditions experienced by racialized groups that are determined by an interplay of complex social processes, one of which is premised on the articulation of racism to effect legitimate exclusion. This process** of racialization **is at work in the disturbing “scientific” assertion that “race” determines academic performance** **made by** Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray in their book **The Bell Curve. Their work illustrates the theoretical minefield of perpetuation such an analytical category in the social sciences and the potential negative consequences on racialized groups. The use of the term “race” serves to conceal the truth that is it not “race” that determines academic performance; but rather, that academic performance is determined by an interplay of complex social processes, one of which is premised on the articulation of racism** (and its subsequent practices of racialization) **to affect exclusion in the classroom and beyond**. It is within the historical and contemporary contexts of such scholarship that differences in skin color have been and are signified as a mark which suggests the existence of different “races.” As a consequence, a primary response among many progressive activists and scholars when we call for the elimination of “race” as an analytical category is to reel off accusations of a “color-blind” discourse. This is not what we are arguing. What we do argue is that **the fixation on skin color is not inherent in its existence but is a product of signification. This is to say, human beings identify skin color to mark or symbolize other phenomena** **in a variety of social contexts in which other significations occur. As a consequence when human practices include and exclude people in light of the signification of skin color, collective identities are produced and social inequalities are structured.** Moreover, **it is this employment of the idea of “race” in the structuring of social relations that is termed racialization.** More specifically**, Miles in his book Racism defines this process of racialization as “those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectives…the concept** therefore **refers to a process of categorization, a representational process defining an Other** (usually, but not exclusively) **somatically.**” Hence, **to interpret accurately the conditions faced by subordinate cultural populations requires us to move from the idea of “Race” to an understanding of racialization and its impact on class formations. This summons a bold analytical transition from the language of “race” to recognizing the centrality of racism and the process of racialization in our understanding of exclusionary practices that give rise to structural inequalities.**

#### The affirmatives focus on the concept of “race” in interpreting inequality only serves to reinforce racialized identity politics.

Just like the governments solution to bus “black” and “white” students as a means to improve “race relations,” the affirmative fails to incorporate issues of class, and will ultimately fail. The 1AC accepts the neutrality of the economy and still maintains the dangerous separation of the political and economic spheres of society.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among social science scholars to focus on notions of “race.” Over the last three decades, **there has been an overwhelming tendency among a variety of critical scholars to focus on the concept of “race” as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization.** As a consequence, **much of the literature on subordinate cultural populations, with its emphasis on such issues as “racial inequality**,” “racial **segregation,**” “racial **identity,” has utilized the construct of “race” as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality** and marginalization**. In turn, this literature has reinforced a racialized politics of identity and representation, with its problematic emphasis on “racial” identity as the overwhelming impulse for political action. This theoretical practice has led to serious analytical weaknesses and absence of depth in much of the historical and contemporary writings on racialized populations in this country.** The politics of **busing in the early 1970s provides an excellent example that illustrates this phenomenon. Social scientists studying “race relations” concluded that contact among “Black” and “White” students would improve “race relations”** and the education conditions of “Black” students if they were bused to “White” (better) schools outside their neighborhoods**. Thirty years later, many parents and educators adamantly denounce the busing solution** (a solution based on a discourse of “race”) as not only fundamentally problematic to the fabric of African American and Chicano communities, **but an erroneous social policy experiment that failed to substantially improve that overall academic performance of students in these communities**. Given this legacy, it is not surprising to find that the theories, practices, and policies that have informed social science analysis of racialized populations today are overwhelmingly rooted in a **politics of identity, a approach that is founded on parochial notions of “race” and representation which ignore the imperatives of capitalist accumulation and the existence of class divisions within racialized subordinate populations. The folly of this position** if critiqued by Ellen Meiksins Wood in her article entitled “Identity Crisis,” where she exposes the limitations of **a politics of identity which fails to contend with the fact that capitalism is the most totalizing system of social relations the world has ever known**. Yet**, in much of the work on Native American, Latino, Native American, and Asian populations, an analysis of class and a critique of capitalism is conspicuously absent. And** even **when it is mentioned, the emphasis is primarily on an undifferentiated plurality of identity politics or an “intersection of oppressions,” which**, unfortunately, **ignores the overwhelming tendency of capitalism to homogenize rather than to diversify human experience.** Moreover, **this practice is particularly disturbing since no matter where one travels around the world, there is no question that racism is integral to the process of capital accumulation. For example, the current socioeconomic conditions of Latinos and other racialized populations can be traced to the relentless emergence of the global economy and recent economic policies of expansion, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement** (NAFTA). A recent United Nations report by the International Labor Organization confirms the negative impact of globalization on racialized populations. By the end of 1998, it was projected that one billion workers would be unemployed. The people of Africa, China, and Latin America have been most affected by the current restricting of capitalist development**. This phenomenon of racialized capitalism is directly linked to the abusive practices and destructive impact of the “global factory**” – a global financial enterprise system **that includes such transnational corporations as Coca Cola, Walmart, Disney,** Ford Motor Company, **and General Motors**. In a recent speech on “global economic apartheid,” John Cavanagh, co-executive director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., comments on the practices of the Ford Motor Company. “The Ford Motor Company has its state-of-the-art assembly plant in Mexico…where because it can deny basic worker rights, it can pay one-tenth the wages and yet get the same quality and the same productivity in producing goods….The same technologies by the way which are easing globalization are also primarily cutting more jobs that they’re creating**.” The failure of scholars to confront this dimension in their analysis of contemporary society as a racialized phenomenon and their tendency to continue treating class as merely one of a multiplicity of** (equally valid) **perspectives, which may or may not “intersect” with** the process of **racialization, are serious shortcomings.** In addressing this issue, we must recognize that **identity politics**, which generally **gloss over class differences and**/or **ignore** **class contradictions, have often been used by radical scholars and activists within African American, Latino, and other subordinate cultural communities in an effort to build a political base.** Here, **fabricated constructions of “race” are objectified and mediated as truth to ignite political support, divorced from the realities of class struggle. By so doing, they unwittingly perpetuated the vacuous and dangerous notion that the political and economic are separate spheres of society which can function independently – a view that firmly anchors and sustains prevailing class relations of power in society.** Ramon Grosfoguel and Chloe S. Georas posit that “social identities are constructed and reproduced in complex and entangled political, economic, and symbolic hierarchy.” Given this complex entanglement, **what is needed is a more dynamic and fluid notion of how we think about different cultural identities within the context of contemporary capitalist social formations. Such a perspective of identity would support our efforts to shatter static and frozen notions that perpetuate ahistorical, apolitical, and classless view of culturally pluralistic societies.** How we analytically accomplish this is no easy matter. But however this task is approached, we must keep in mind Wood’s concern: **“We should not confuse respect for the plurality of human experience and social struggles with a complete dissolution of historical causality, where there is nothing but diversity, difference and contingency, no unifying structures, no logic of process, no capitalism and therefore no negation of it, no universal project of human emancipation.”** Hence, **if we are to effectively challenge the horrendous economic impacts of globalization on racialized communities, we must recognize that a politics of identity is** grossly inept and **unsuited for building and sustaining collective political movements for social justice** and economic democracy. Instead, **what we need is to fundamentally reframe the very terrain that gives life to our political movements** for social justice and economic democracy. Instead, what we need is to fundamentally reframe the very terrain that gives life to our political understanding of what it means to live, work, and struggle in a society with widening class differentiation and ever-increasing racialized inequality**. Through** such **an analytical process of reframing, we can expand the terms by which identities are** considered, examined, and **defined, recognizing racialized relations of power are fundamentally shaped by the profound organizational and spatial transformations of the capitalist economy.**

### Priortization

#### Capitalism is the starting point for all other political considerations – class struggle is the universal antagonism that creates space for particular struggles like feminism and anti-racism. A political strategy that does not address capital will ensure that larger structures of oppression remain intact.

**McLaren 06** (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, <http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm>, jj)

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series *that sustains the horizon of the series itself*. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (*Totalitarianism* 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the *fantasy* of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its *reality*. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without *revolution*; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

#### Class must be recognized as qualitatively the most important oppression—otherwise the system is able to satisfy demands on grounds of formal equality, destroying attempts to overcome capitalist oppression.

**Giminez, ’01** [Martha, Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: <http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html>]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. **This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory**, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). **Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it.** Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). **Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators** (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). **Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher** (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, **class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression**. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. **The working class**, on the other hand**, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital** and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). **While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged**. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. **The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth**, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. **In so far as** the **"class"** in RGC **remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.** Nevertheless, **I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument** not only **on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change** but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that **some power relations are more important and consequential than others**. **For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former**. In my view, **the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations.** In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression**, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination**. **Class relations** -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- **are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them.** **Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers.** **Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances.** **To argue**, then, **that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.**

### Eurocentrism

#### We are not Marx

#### Marxisms early writings may qualify as Eurocentric, but his later writings make a corrective to that. Latin American revolutionary movements prove.

Riddell, 09, (John, editor of a number of books publishing the key documents and resolutions of the international revolutionary socialist movement from 1907 to 1923. Six volumes have been published to date, by Pathfinder Press, under the title [The Communist International in Lenin’s Time](http://readingfromtheleft.com/Books/CI/LeninsTime.html). <http://kasamaproject.org/theory/1823-55is-marxism-eurocentric-a-view-from-latin-america>)

In Kohan's opinion, the Cuban revolution's leading role continued in the 1970s, when it "revived the revolutionary Marxism of the 1920s (simultaneously anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist) as well as Marx's more unfamiliar works -- above all his later works that study colonialism and peripheral and dependent societies. In these writings Marx overcomes the Eurocentric views of his youth."12¶ Kohan identifies the insights of the "Late Marx" as follows:¶ History does not follow an unvarying evolutionary path.¶ Western Europe does not constitute a single evolutionary centre through which stages of historical development are radiated outwards to the rest of the world.¶ "Subjugated peoples do not experience 'progress' so long as they remain under the boot of imperialism."13¶ Latin American thought here rests on the mature Marx's views on capitalism's impact on colonial societies, such as Ireland. It also intersects with Marx's late writings and research known to us primarily through Teodor Shanin's Late Marx and the Russian Road.14 Shanin's book can now be usefully reread as a commentary on today's Latin American struggles.¶ ¶ Marx devoted much of his last decade to study of Russia and of Indigenous societies in North America. His limited writings on these questions focused on the Russian peasant commune, the mir, which then constituted the social foundation of agriculture in that country.

#### Marx is the origin of anti-colonialist thought.

Hampton, 12 (Paul, Alliance for Workers Liberty, January 28, http://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/paulhampton/2012/01/26/marxism-eurocentric)

Marx wrote hundreds of articles for the New York Daily Tribune newspaper in the 1850s and it is here that his first writings on the wider world beyond Europe are found. Much of his early research (which would continue to the end of his life) concerned India. Marx wrote in 1853 that Britain’s colonisation of India had fulfilled a double mission: “the annihilation of old Asiatic society and the laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia” (The Future Results of British Rule in India, 22 July 1853). But far from justifying colonialism, Marx actually provided the basis for resisting it. He wrote that “the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindostan had to suffer before” and that British rule in India unveiled the “profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilisation”. ¶ Beyond denouncing British imperialism, Marx also pointed out that “a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government”. He looked forward to the time when “the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether”. In Investigation of Tortures in India (17 September 1857), Marx asked readers to consider “whether a people are not justified in attempting to expel the foreign conquerors who have so abused their subjects”. In the late 1850s, Marx supported the Sepoy Uprising in India as well as Chinese resistance to the British during the Second Opium War. ¶ Marx’s 1853 writings on India constitute the first instance of a major European thinker supporting India’s independence. This has been acknowledged by Indian historian Ifran Habib, who argued: “In 1853 to set colonial emancipation, not just colonial reform, as an objective of the European socialist movement; and still more, to look forward to a national liberation movement (‘throwing off the English yoke’) attained through their struggle by the Indian people, as an event that might even precede the emancipation of the European working class – such an insight and vision could belong to Marx alone” (Anderson 2010 p.23).

#### Marxism historically was aligned with anti-racist movements

Hampton, 12 (Paul, Alliance for Workers Liberty, January 28, http://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/paulhampton/2012/01/26/marxism-eurocentric)

Marx was also politically clear and explicit about the greatest anti-racist cause of his day, namely the abolition of slavery in the United States. Marx was public and vocal in his support for the anti-slavery dynamic of the US civil war, lauding the support given by British cotton workers to the North (despite personal hardship) and demanding that the North make “the emancipation of the slaves” its motto. Marx did not ignore the issue of racism in Capital, when he wrote that “Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.” ¶ Anderson also discusses Marx’s attitude toward national oppression, highlighting the evolution of his views on Poland and Ireland. Marx and Engels both spoke at the London meeting in November 1847 to mark the seventeenth anniversary of the Polish uprising, where Engels stated that “a nation cannot become free and at the same time continue to oppress other nations”. Marx wrote to Engels (2 December 1856) that the attitude towards Polish independence was the “‘external’ thermometer” of the credentials of revolutionaries. Anderson draws out particularly well Marx’s support for Chechen rebels against Russia, which was visible in over a dozen articles written during the Crimean war (2010 p.51). ¶ Marx used his inaugural address to the International Working Men’s Association, to draw attention to the national oppression of Poland and the Chechen. Their treatment had “taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the simple laws or morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations. The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes” (27 October 1864). The London Conference of the First International (25-29 September 1865) passed a resolution which stated: “That it is imperative to annihilate the invading influence of Russia in Europe by applying to Poland ‘the right of every people to dispose of itself’ and re-establishing that country on a social and democratic basis” (Cummins 1980 p.94). ¶ Anderson does not discuss Engels’ conception of “non-historic peoples” in great detail, since his focus is on Marx (It was also dealt with exhaustively by Rosdolsky). However it is clear from the book that dividing peoples into “historic” and “non-historic” is no part of the Marxist approach to national questions. Anderson is also forthright about Marx’s “extremely problematic comments on Jews in his published work”. He states: “None, not even Marx’s strongest defenders on this issue, however, have suggested that Marx made a significant positive contribution on the issue of Jews and anti-Semitism” (2010 p.52). Later Marxists, including Engels, Bebel, Kautsky and Trotsky did however develop more coherent Marxist interpretations. ¶ Marx’s most developed treatment of the national question was his stance on Ireland. Cummins criticised the early Engels for holding to “an Anglocentric approach to the liberation of Ireland” (1980 p.108). Yet it was Engels who highlighted the plight of Irish migrant workers in The Condition of the Working-Class in England (1845) and who played a major role in informing Marx of the realities of Ireland. He wrote to Marx that “Ireland may be regarded as the earliest English colony and one which, by reason of proximity, is still governed in exactly the same old way; here one cannot fail to notice that the English citizen’s so-called freedom is based on the oppression of the colonies” (23 May 1856). Engels also wrote that “Irish history shows what a misfortune it is for one nation to subjugate another. All English abominations have their origin in the Irish pale” (24 October 1869). ¶ After nearly 25 years as a revolutionary, Marx came out for Irish independence. He wrote to Engels: “I once believed the separation of Ireland from England to be impossible. I now regard it as inevitable, although federation may follow upon separation” (2 November 1867). In his Speech on the Irish Question, Marx wrote that “The English should demand separation and leave it to the Irish themselves to decide the question of landownership. Everything else would be useless” (16 December 1867).¶ Marx emphasised Irish oppression and the benefits of separation for English workers. He wrote to Kugelmann: “I have become more and more convinced — and the thing now is to drum this conviction into the English working class — that they will never be able to do anything decisive here in England before they separate their attitude towards Ireland quite definitely from that of the ruling classes, and not only make common cause with the Irish, but even take the initiative in dissolving the Union established in 1801, and substituting a free federal relationship for it”. He argued that “this must be done not out of sympathy for Ireland, but as a demand based on the interests of the English proletariat”, otherwise “the English people will remain bound to the leading-strings of the ruling classes”. For Marx, “every movement of the working class in England itself is crippled by the dissension with the Irish, who form a very important section of the working class in England itself”. However in Ireland itself, “once affairs have been laid in the hands of the Irish people themselves, as soon as they have made themselves their own legislators and rulers, as soon as they have become autonomous, it will be infinitely easier there than here to abolish the landed aristocracy” (29 November 1869). ¶ On the one hand, England was “the metropolis of capital”, the dominant power on the world market and “the only country in which the material conditions for this revolution have reached a certain degree of maturity”. Marx argued that the sole means of hastening the social revolution was to make Ireland independent. The task of the International was “to make the English workers realise that for them the national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment but the first condition of their own social emancipation” (Letter to Meyer and Vogt, 9 April 1870).¶ Anderson does not discuss the gaps and omissions in Marx’s understanding of Ireland. Nor does he analyse the limitations of Marx’s view of the national question. However he quotes a comment by Erica Benner that, “It would be wrong to infer that his support for Irish independence brought him [Marx] closer to endorsing a supra-historical principle of national self-determination” (Anderson 2010 p.151). This seems to miss the point. The essence of self-determination is the subjective sense that peoples themselves determine their identity (“dispose of itself”) and form of self-government (“affairs in their own hands”). Marx and Engels did not start by applying this principle to every people, but by the end of their lives there they had substantially widened its application, including to the non-European world. There are sufficient grounds to suggest their view is consistent with later Marxists who explicitly supported the “right” to national self-determination. What Marx rightly avoided was to assume that the right to self-determination automatically meant “advocating independence” in every case. The solution proffered depended on the impact on the working class and on international relations. ¶ One of the most important arguments Anderson makes is that Marx’s views on race, nationality and non-European societies developed over his lifetime and that the mature Marx had a more sophisticated assessment in his political economy and later studies. He decisively rejects the view, which was promulgated by the Stalinists, of a unilinear succession of stage in history, with capitalism preceded only by “feudalism”. It is clear from Marx’s political economy, particularly the first draft (the Grundrisse) and second draft (1861-63 manuscripts) of what he called the Asiatic mode of production that pre-capitalist economic societies took a variety of forms. Recent Marxist writing on the “tributary mode of production” has advanced the multilinearity of class societies in history. ¶ Anderson successfully nails one of the great myths against Marxism, namely that it assumes all societies will follow the same path through capitalism. In the preface to the first German edition of Capital volume 1, Marx is usually translated as believing that “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future”. However the later French edition can be translated slightly differently as “the country that is more developed industrially only shows to those that follow it on the industrial path, the image of its own future”. Anderson believes that the altered text made clear, as far as Marx was concerned, that “his narrative of primitive accumulation was meant as a description of Western European development, nothing more, and hardly a global grand narrative” (2010 p.179). ¶ A further notable contribution is Anderson’s discussion of Marx’s last studies. In 1879-82, Marx made excerpt notebooks on non-Western and precapitalist societies, which extend to over 300,000 words. They were not published even in the heyday of the Bolsheviks: Riazanov characterised them as examples of “inexcusable pedantry”. Some of the material was published by Lawrence Krader in The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (1972). Krader pointed to the possibility that these notebooks were concerned “not so much with the origins of social hierarchy in the distant past, as with the social relations within contemporary societies under the impact of capitalist globalisation” (2010 p.201). ¶ In these last writings, Marx was not simply carrying over concepts of social structure drawn from the Western European model into Asian social relations. Marx wrote to editors of Otechestvennye Zapiski that “by studying each of these evolutions separately, and then comparing them, one will easily find the key to these phenomena, but one will never succeed with the master-key of a historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical” (November 1877). The Marxist method meant starting from the “specific economic form in which surplus labour was pumped out of the direct producers”. This conception of exploitation and from it a distinctive conception of class relations, allowed for wide variation in societies and states, not only in the past but in the modern world. This insight is absolutely central to understanding the evolution of capitalism (and indeed of Stalinist societies) since Marx’s death. ¶ Anderson’s book is a valuable addition to Marxist literature. He is right that Marx “kept searching for new allies for the Western working class in its struggle against capital”. Marx was a theorist who “took account of nationalism and ethnicity as well as class”. In his mature works, Marx was not occupied solely with the capital relation and the class struggle, to the exclusion of nationalism, race and ethnicity (2010 p.238-39). Much underlabouring is still needed to integrate these vectors into a coherent Marxist view of current reality. The insights which Anderson extracts from Marx’s work will help us with that task.¶

# 1nr

### A2 – Marx Eurocentric

#### Marxisms early writings may qualify as Eurocentric, but his later writings make a corrective to that. Latin American revolutionary movements prove.

Riddell, 09, (John, editor of a number of books publishing the key documents and resolutions of the international revolutionary socialist movement from 1907 to 1923. Six volumes have been published to date, by Pathfinder Press, under the title [The Communist International in Lenin’s Time](http://readingfromtheleft.com/Books/CI/LeninsTime.html). <http://kasamaproject.org/theory/1823-55is-marxism-eurocentric-a-view-from-latin-america>)

In Kohan's opinion, the Cuban revolution's leading role continued in the 1970s, when it "revived the revolutionary Marxism of the 1920s (simultaneously anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist) as well as Marx's more unfamiliar works -- above all his later works that study colonialism and peripheral and dependent societies. In these writings Marx overcomes the Eurocentric views of his youth."12¶ Kohan identifies the insights of the "Late Marx" as follows:¶ History does not follow an unvarying evolutionary path.¶ Western Europe does not constitute a single evolutionary centre through which stages of historical development are radiated outwards to the rest of the world.¶ "Subjugated peoples do not experience 'progress' so long as they remain under the boot of imperialism."13¶ Latin American thought here rests on the mature Marx's views on capitalism's impact on colonial societies, such as Ireland. It also intersects with Marx's late writings and research known to us primarily through Teodor Shanin's Late Marx and the Russian Road.14 Shanin's book can now be usefully reread as a commentary on today's Latin American struggles.¶ ¶ Marx devoted much of his last decade to study of Russia and of Indigenous societies in North America. His limited writings on these questions focused on the Russian peasant commune, the mir, which then constituted the social foundation of agriculture in that country.

#### Marx is the origin of anti-colonialist thought.

Hampton, 12 (Paul, Alliance for Workers Liberty, January 28, http://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/paulhampton/2012/01/26/marxism-eurocentric)

Marx wrote hundreds of articles for the New York Daily Tribune newspaper in the 1850s and it is here that his first writings on the wider world beyond Europe are found. Much of his early research (which would continue to the end of his life) concerned India. Marx wrote in 1853 that Britain’s colonisation of India had fulfilled a double mission: “the annihilation of old Asiatic society and the laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia” (The Future Results of British Rule in India, 22 July 1853). But far from justifying colonialism, Marx actually provided the basis for resisting it. He wrote that “the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindostan had to suffer before” and that British rule in India unveiled the “profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilisation”. ¶ Beyond denouncing British imperialism, Marx also pointed out that “a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government”. He looked forward to the time when “the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether”. In Investigation of Tortures in India (17 September 1857), Marx asked readers to consider “whether a people are not justified in attempting to expel the foreign conquerors who have so abused their subjects”. In the late 1850s, Marx supported the Sepoy Uprising in India as well as Chinese resistance to the British during the Second Opium War. ¶ Marx’s 1853 writings on India constitute the first instance of a major European thinker supporting India’s independence. This has been acknowledged by Indian historian Ifran Habib, who argued: “In 1853 to set colonial emancipation, not just colonial reform, as an objective of the European socialist movement; and still more, to look forward to a national liberation movement (‘throwing off the English yoke’) attained through their struggle by the Indian people, as an event that might even precede the emancipation of the European working class – such an insight and vision could belong to Marx alone” (Anderson 2010 p.23).

#### Marxism historically was aligned with anti-racist movements

Hampton, 12 (Paul, Alliance for Workers Liberty, January 28, http://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/paulhampton/2012/01/26/marxism-eurocentric)

Marx was also politically clear and explicit about the greatest anti-racist cause of his day, namely the abolition of slavery in the United States. Marx was public and vocal in his support for the anti-slavery dynamic of the US civil war, lauding the support given by British cotton workers to the North (despite personal hardship) and demanding that the North make “the emancipation of the slaves” its motto. Marx did not ignore the issue of racism in Capital, when he wrote that “Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.” ¶ Anderson also discusses Marx’s attitude toward national oppression, highlighting the evolution of his views on Poland and Ireland. Marx and Engels both spoke at the London meeting in November 1847 to mark the seventeenth anniversary of the Polish uprising, where Engels stated that “a nation cannot become free and at the same time continue to oppress other nations”. Marx wrote to Engels (2 December 1856) that the attitude towards Polish independence was the “‘external’ thermometer” of the credentials of revolutionaries. Anderson draws out particularly well Marx’s support for Chechen rebels against Russia, which was visible in over a dozen articles written during the Crimean war (2010 p.51). ¶ Marx used his inaugural address to the International Working Men’s Association, to draw attention to the national oppression of Poland and the Chechen. Their treatment had “taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the simple laws or morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations. The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes” (27 October 1864). The London Conference of the First International (25-29 September 1865) passed a resolution which stated: “That it is imperative to annihilate the invading influence of Russia in Europe by applying to Poland ‘the right of every people to dispose of itself’ and re-establishing that country on a social and democratic basis” (Cummins 1980 p.94). ¶ Anderson does not discuss Engels’ conception of “non-historic peoples” in great detail, since his focus is on Marx (It was also dealt with exhaustively by Rosdolsky). However it is clear from the book that dividing peoples into “historic” and “non-historic” is no part of the Marxist approach to national questions. Anderson is also forthright about Marx’s “extremely problematic comments on Jews in his published work”. He states: “None, not even Marx’s strongest defenders on this issue, however, have suggested that Marx made a significant positive contribution on the issue of Jews and anti-Semitism” (2010 p.52). Later Marxists, including Engels, Bebel, Kautsky and Trotsky did however develop more coherent Marxist interpretations. ¶ Marx’s most developed treatment of the national question was his stance on Ireland. Cummins criticised the early Engels for holding to “an Anglocentric approach to the liberation of Ireland” (1980 p.108). Yet it was Engels who highlighted the plight of Irish migrant workers in The Condition of the Working-Class in England (1845) and who played a major role in informing Marx of the realities of Ireland. He wrote to Marx that “Ireland may be regarded as the earliest English colony and one which, by reason of proximity, is still governed in exactly the same old way; here one cannot fail to notice that the English citizen’s so-called freedom is based on the oppression of the colonies” (23 May 1856). Engels also wrote that “Irish history shows what a misfortune it is for one nation to subjugate another. All English abominations have their origin in the Irish pale” (24 October 1869). ¶ After nearly 25 years as a revolutionary, Marx came out for Irish independence. He wrote to Engels: “I once believed the separation of Ireland from England to be impossible. I now regard it as inevitable, although federation may follow upon separation” (2 November 1867). In his Speech on the Irish Question, Marx wrote that “The English should demand separation and leave it to the Irish themselves to decide the question of landownership. Everything else would be useless” (16 December 1867).¶ Marx emphasised Irish oppression and the benefits of separation for English workers. He wrote to Kugelmann: “I have become more and more convinced — and the thing now is to drum this conviction into the English working class — that they will never be able to do anything decisive here in England before they separate their attitude towards Ireland quite definitely from that of the ruling classes, and not only make common cause with the Irish, but even take the initiative in dissolving the Union established in 1801, and substituting a free federal relationship for it”. He argued that “this must be done not out of sympathy for Ireland, but as a demand based on the interests of the English proletariat”, otherwise “the English people will remain bound to the leading-strings of the ruling classes”. For Marx, “every movement of the working class in England itself is crippled by the dissension with the Irish, who form a very important section of the working class in England itself”. However in Ireland itself, “once affairs have been laid in the hands of the Irish people themselves, as soon as they have made themselves their own legislators and rulers, as soon as they have become autonomous, it will be infinitely easier there than here to abolish the landed aristocracy” (29 November 1869). ¶ On the one hand, England was “the metropolis of capital”, the dominant power on the world market and “the only country in which the material conditions for this revolution have reached a certain degree of maturity”. Marx argued that the sole means of hastening the social revolution was to make Ireland independent. The task of the International was “to make the English workers realise that for them the national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment but the first condition of their own social emancipation” (Letter to Meyer and Vogt, 9 April 1870).¶ Anderson does not discuss the gaps and omissions in Marx’s understanding of Ireland. Nor does he analyse the limitations of Marx’s view of the national question. However he quotes a comment by Erica Benner that, “It would be wrong to infer that his support for Irish independence brought him [Marx] closer to endorsing a supra-historical principle of national self-determination” (Anderson 2010 p.151). This seems to miss the point. The essence of self-determination is the subjective sense that peoples themselves determine their identity (“dispose of itself”) and form of self-government (“affairs in their own hands”). Marx and Engels did not start by applying this principle to every people, but by the end of their lives there they had substantially widened its application, including to the non-European world. There are sufficient grounds to suggest their view is consistent with later Marxists who explicitly supported the “right” to national self-determination. What Marx rightly avoided was to assume that the right to self-determination automatically meant “advocating independence” in every case. The solution proffered depended on the impact on the working class and on international relations. ¶ One of the most important arguments Anderson makes is that Marx’s views on race, nationality and non-European societies developed over his lifetime and that the mature Marx had a more sophisticated assessment in his political economy and later studies. He decisively rejects the view, which was promulgated by the Stalinists, of a unilinear succession of stage in history, with capitalism preceded only by “feudalism”. It is clear from Marx’s political economy, particularly the first draft (the Grundrisse) and second draft (1861-63 manuscripts) of what he called the Asiatic mode of production that pre-capitalist economic societies took a variety of forms. Recent Marxist writing on the “tributary mode of production” has advanced the multilinearity of class societies in history. ¶ Anderson successfully nails one of the great myths against Marxism, namely that it assumes all societies will follow the same path through capitalism. In the preface to the first German edition of Capital volume 1, Marx is usually translated as believing that “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future”. However the later French edition can be translated slightly differently as “the country that is more developed industrially only shows to those that follow it on the industrial path, the image of its own future”. Anderson believes that the altered text made clear, as far as Marx was concerned, that “his narrative of primitive accumulation was meant as a description of Western European development, nothing more, and hardly a global grand narrative” (2010 p.179). ¶ A further notable contribution is Anderson’s discussion of Marx’s last studies. In 1879-82, Marx made excerpt notebooks on non-Western and precapitalist societies, which extend to over 300,000 words. They were not published even in the heyday of the Bolsheviks: Riazanov characterised them as examples of “inexcusable pedantry”. Some of the material was published by Lawrence Krader in The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (1972). Krader pointed to the possibility that these notebooks were concerned “not so much with the origins of social hierarchy in the distant past, as with the social relations within contemporary societies under the impact of capitalist globalisation” (2010 p.201). ¶ In these last writings, Marx was not simply carrying over concepts of social structure drawn from the Western European model into Asian social relations. Marx wrote to editors of Otechestvennye Zapiski that “by studying each of these evolutions separately, and then comparing them, one will easily find the key to these phenomena, but one will never succeed with the master-key of a historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical” (November 1877). The Marxist method meant starting from the “specific economic form in which surplus labour was pumped out of the direct producers”. This conception of exploitation and from it a distinctive conception of class relations, allowed for wide variation in societies and states, not only in the past but in the modern world. This insight is absolutely central to understanding the evolution of capitalism (and indeed of Stalinist societies) since Marx’s death. ¶ Anderson’s book is a valuable addition to Marxist literature. He is right that Marx “kept searching for new allies for the Western working class in its struggle against capital”. Marx was a theorist who “took account of nationalism and ethnicity as well as class”. In his mature works, Marx was not occupied solely with the capital relation and the class struggle, to the exclusion of nationalism, race and ethnicity (2010 p.238-39). Much underlabouring is still needed to integrate these vectors into a coherent Marxist view of current reality. The insights which Anderson extracts from Marx’s work will help us with that task.¶

### Alt

#### The alt is not the SQ --- it’s the performance of an anti-capitalist pedagogy --- its mutually exclusive with theirs because it foregrounds questions of blackness rather than class-based exclusions

#### If the “plan” of the aff is the whole 1ac, then the “alt” of the neg is the whole 1nc --- we talk about class and prioritize discussions of capitalism to explain why bad stuff happens

#### McLaren & Giminez say that capitalism should be the starting point for all political considerations --- this is the only universal that can then open space for struggles like anti-racism. Any political struggle that doesn’t prioritize capital first just ensures that oppression remains the same --- nothing ever changes because capitalism continuously oppresses --- it should happen in academia first --- we have to ask ourselves the critical questions of how to overcome capitalism --- the is the starting point --- we prioritize the question of class

#### Class based critical pedagogy empowers students to challenge capitalist exploitation and breakdown systems of domination-solves scholarship

**McLaren and Farahmandpur 2005** (Peter McLaren, professor of Education at UCLA and Ramin Farahmandpur, assistant professor of education at Portland state, “Teaching Against Global Capitalism,” pgs 53-54, 2005)

Paulo **Freire’s critique of capitalism**, in particular his critique of class exploitation, **has largely been ignored by critical educationalists operating within the precincts of postmodern theory and cultural studied. This is a lamentable situation,** especially **given Freire’s totemic status among progressive educators and the fact that his writings serve as the railhead of the critical educational tradition**. In his early work especially, **Freire** (1978**) positioned education as an ideological and political activity that intimately linked to social production. Critical education**, he argued, **empowers students and workers to organize and classify knowledge by differentiating between bourgeois ideology and working-class ideology, bourgeois culture and working-class culture, and ruling-class interests and working-class interests. As an offspring to Freirean pedagogy, critical pedagogy seeks to reclaim these distinctions identified by Freire as well as to transcend the existing antagonisms between manual and mental labor,** theory and practice, teaching and learning, and what is known and what can be known. In this respect, Freire (1978) raised important questions regarding the relationship between education and social production, such as, **“Why is anything produced? What should be produced? How should it be produced?”** (107). **We join Freire in arguing that, as part of a larger concerted effort of educating workers and students, critical pedagogy must also address the following questions: “What to know? How to know? In benefit of what and of whom to know?** Moreover, against what and whom to know?” (100). Following Freire’s (1978) lead, **critical pedagogy supports the practice of students and workers reflecting critically not only on their location in the world and against the world but also on their relationship with the world.** Freire maintained that **productive labor is the basis for critical knowledge and visa versa.** Subsequently**, a critical analysis of schooling begins by examining the relationship between productive labor and critical knowledge. That is, critical education is associated with productive labor, with labor that privileges use value over exchange value. While capitalist schooling provides students with basic knowledge and skills that increase their productivity and efficiency as future workers and that** subsequently **reproduce class relations, critical pedagogy works toward the revolutionary empowerment of students and workers by offering them opportunities to develop critical social skills that will assist them in gaining an awareness of** – and a resolve to transform **– the exploitative nature of capitalist social and economic relations of production. Worker and student empowerment requires teachers in urban schools to acknowledge and exploit critically the dialectical unity between theory and practice and action and reflection (**Friere 1978). **Reflection on one’s own social practice means being attentive to the concrete social and economic issues in the workplace and in schools. It further stipulates that workers and students gain a critical purchase of their social location. Freire referred to this as achieving a “radical form of being,”** which he associated with “beings that not only know, but know that they know” (24). **The revolutionary character of Freire’s approach is lucidly reflected in** Bertell **Ollman’s description of what constitutes a “dialectical understanding” of everyday life**. Ollman (1998b) argues that **a dialectical understanding of social life is “more indispensable now than ever before”** (342) **because he believes that the current stage of capitalism is characterized by far greater complexity and much faster change and interaction than at any time in human history**. In tracing the social, economic, and political antagonisms under capitalism, Marxist dialectics conceives of capitalism to be constituted by “intersecting and overlapping contradictions…Among the more important of these are the contradictions between use-value and exchange-value, between capital and labor in the production process (and between capitalists and workers in the class struggle), between capitalist forces and capitalist relations of production, between competition and cooperation, between science and ideology, between political democracy and economic servitude, and – perhaps most decisively – between social production and private appropriation (or what some have recast as the “logic of production vs. the logic of consumption”).” (350) Ollman (1998b) captures the essence of Marxian dialectical process when he writes, “Marx’s dialectics views reality as an internally related whole with temporal as well as spatial dimensions. Things that are separate and independent…cannot be in contradiction, since contradiction implies that an important change in any part will produce changes of a comparable magnitude throughout the system” (349). **In exposing they underlying contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production, socialist pedagogy encourages critical educators to employ a dialectical understanding of the social world in their classroom by creating conditions for students to explore how class exploitation, racism, and sexism constitute a set of complex social, cultural, political, and economic relationships in which every individual is implicated** (Ollman 1978). In underscoring the significance of the concept of “relations,” Ollman (1978) remarks, “The relations that people ordinarily assume to exist between things are viewed here as existing within (as a necessary part of) each thing in turn, now conceived of a relation (likewise, the changes which any “thing” undergoes). The peculiar notion of relation is the key to understanding the entire dialectic, and is used to unlock the otherwise mysterious notions of totality, abstraction, identity, law, and contradiction. (227-28)”

#### WE must move beyond questions of “race” to challenge the dominate ideology that makes racism possible. Only then can we dismantle forms of exclusion maintained by capital exploitation.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

In light of this, **we posit a critical conceptualization of racism with which to analyze both historical and contemporary social expierences and institutional realities. Insofar as such a concept, whether employed in social investigation or political struggle, reveals patterns of discrimination and resulting inequalities, it raises the question: “What actions must be taken to dismantle these inequalities? This in turn requires nothing less than to confront racism in all its dimensions head-on. At the risk of being redundant, we must emphasize once again that rejecting “race” as having a real referent in the social world goes not mean denying the existence of racism, or the denial of historical and cultural experiences predicated on a specific population’s particular struggle against racism. Rather, a critical theory of racism represents a bold and forthright move to challenge common-sense notions of “race” that often lead not only to profound forms of essentialism and ahistorical perceptions of oppression, but also make it nearly impossible to dismantle the external material structures of domination that sustain racialized inequalities in schools and the larger society.** Further, we recognize the empirical reality that **people believe in the existence of biologically distinct races. This can be captured analytically by stating that people employ the idea of “race” in the construction and interpretation of their social worlds/ Similarly, we acknowledge that it is a common practice among the oppressed to invert the experience of exploitation**. This is to say that **negative notions of “race” linked to racist ideology are turned on their head and employed to fuel political movements among racialized populations. Social activists and scholars are not obliged to accept the common-sense ideas employed in the social world and use them as analytical concepts. The whole tradition of critical/Marxist analysis highlights the importance of developing an analytical framework that penetrates the surface and reified realities of social relations.** (See, for example, Marx’s discussion of the distinction between phenomenal forms and essential relations, his discussion of reification, and his discussion of method in the Introduction to the Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie [1939].) In keeping with this tradition, **we focus on racism as an analytical concept – a concept that has a real object in the social world, namely an ideology with a set of specific characteristics informed by economic imperatives – and we only refer to this idea of “race” when people use the notion in their everyday genres, utilizing it to make social distinctions based on the significance that is attached to** differences between **populations.** Finally, **unlike scholars who argue resolutely for a critical theory of “race,” we seek a critical language and conceptual apparatus that makes racism the central category of analysis in our understanding of racialized inequality, while simultaneously encompassing the multiple social expressions of racism.** Undoubtedly, **this entails the development of a critical language from which activists and scholars can reconstruct theories and practices of contemporary society that more accurately reflect and address capitalist forms of social and material inequities that shape the lives of racialized populations. Most importantly, we are calling for a critical theory of racism that can grapple with a radical remaking of democracy in the age of a globalized post-industrial economy. There are many who have proclaimed the death of the socialist project, but we argue that its renaissance is close at hand and will be articulated through a language that is fueled by the courage and passion to break with those hegemonic traditions on the left that fail to support a democratic vision of life for all people.**

### Impact

#### Conceded framing issue --- resisting the violence of the global capitalist system is your ultimate ethical responsibility --- capitalism renders the mass cruelty it inflicts invisible and mystified by excluding vast swaths of the third world from its economic calculations --- -- that’s zizek ad daly -- the ballot should be used to reward the team whose ideology is the most ethical --- our McLaren & Giminiez evidence says academia is the critical place to start this --- the only thing that changes after this round is our own alignment with capitalist ideology

#### Now you can’t solve anything without solving it all --- capitalism is the reason for things like war and environmental destruction and exclusion because it ensures social relations are dominated by systems of capital --- makes impacts inevitable --- only a criticism which attacks the universality of capitalism solves --- tahts zizek 89

### RC

#### They are fundamentally and historically wrong about slavery --- the reason lower class Europeans weren’t enslaved is because they spoke the right language --- they could speak out --- they needed a worker that could be economically exploited --- wilderson doesn’t understand this --- that’s our selfa card

#### Question of what caused what historically are also irrelevant --- our zizek 08 card says that its not longer a question of superiority or hatred --- modern slavery can be understood --- its because of economic egotism ---- thinking that one is more economically important than another

#### Our Juan evidence explains that looking at racial relations as a starting point instead of capitalism just continues to entrench competition and destroys any universal consciousness --- it sustains white racism to cover up the contradictions wilderson talks about --- its just used to maintain capitalism

#### The aff is a fundamental misreading of history

\*\* No where is the failure of the aff’s paradigm more evident then in their argument we should begin with blackness and slavery.  The aff’s re-telling of the history of slavery omits the central cause of the slave-trade:  class.  Absent an accurate understanding of historical process, they cannot hope to redress the harms of past injustice.

Slav, prejudice predate not cap

Darder, and Torress, 04 [Antonia, Prof of education policy studies at U of Illinois, and Rodolfo, Associate prof of latino studies at UC Irvine, After Race:  Racism after multiculturalism, p.6-8 //liam]

Although today “race” is generally linked to phenotypic characteris tics, there is a strong consensus among evolutionary biologists and ge netic anthropologists that “biologically identifiable human races do not exist; Homo sapiens constitute a single species, and have been so since their evolution in Africa and throughout their migration around the world” (Lee, Mountain, and Koenig 2001, 39). This perspective is simi lar to that which existed prior to the eighteenth century, when the notion that there were distinct populations whose differences were grounded in biology did not exist. For the Greeks, for example, the term “barbarian” was tied to how civilized a people were considered to be (generally based on language rather than genetics). So how did all this begin? George Fredrickson (2002), writing on the history of racism, identifies the anticipatory moment of modern racism with the “treatment of Jew ish converts to Christianity in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain. Conversos were identified and discriminated against because of the belief held by Christians that the impurity of their blood made them incapable of experiencing a true conversion” (31). Fredrickson argues that the racism inherent in the quasi-religious, Spanish doctrine of limpeza de sangre, referring to purity of blood, set the stage for the spread of racism to the New World: To the extent that it was enforced represented the stigmatization of an entire ethnic group on the basis of deficiencies that allegedly could not be eradicated by conversion or assimilation. Inherited social status was nothing new; the concept of “noble blood” had long meant that the off spring of certain families were born with a claim to high status. But when the status of large numbers of people was depressed purely and simply because of their derivation from a denigrated ethnos, a line had been crossed that gave “race” a new and more comprehensive significance. (33) Hence, religious notions, steeped in an ideology of “race,” played a significant role in the exportation of racism into the Americas, wheiie domination by the superior “race” was perceived as “inevitable and de sirable, because it was thought to lead to human progress” (Castles 1996, 21). The emergence of “race” as ideology can also be traced to the rise of nationalism. Efforts by nation-states to extend or deny rights of citizenship contingent on “race” or “ethnicity” were not uncommon, even within so-called democratic republics. Here, national mythology about those with “the biological unfitness for full citizenship” (Fredrickson 2002, 68) served to sanction exclusionary practices, despite the fact that all people shared “the historical process of migration and intermingling” (Castles 1996, 21). Herein is contained the logic behind what Valle and Torres (2000) term “the policing of race,” a condition that results in official policies and practices by the nation-state designed to exclude or curtail the rights of racialized populations. In Germany, the Nazi regime took the logic of “race” to its pinnacle, rendering Jewish and Gypsy pop ulations a threat to the state, thus rationalizing and justifying their demise. This example disrupts the notion that racism occurs only within the context of black-white relations. Instead, Castles (1996) argues that economic exploitation has always been central to the emergence of racism. Whether it incorporated slavery or indentured servitude, racial ized systems of labor were perpetrated in Europe against inunigrants, in cluding Irish, Jewish, and Polish workers, as well as against indigenous populations around the world. In the midst of the “scientific” penchant of the eighteenth century, Carolus Linneaus developed one of the first topologies to actually cate gorize human beings into four distinct subspecies: americanus, asiaticus, africanus, and europeaeus. Linneaus’s classification, allegedly neutral and scientific, included not only physical features but also behavioral charac teristics, hierarchically arranged in accordance with the prevailing social values and the political-economic interests of the times. The predictable result is the current ideological configuration of “race”. used to both ex plain and control social behavior. Etienne Balibar’s (2003) work on racism is useful in understanding the ideological justifications that historically have accompanied the exclu sion and domination of racialized populations—a phenomenon heavily fueled by the tensions of internal migration in the Current era of global ization. [R]acism describes in an abstract idealizing manner “types of human ity,” and. . . makes extensive use of classifications which allow all indi viduals and groups to imagine answers for the most immediate existen tial questions, such as imposition of identities and the permanence of vi olence between nations, ethnic or religious communities. (3) Balibar also points to the impact of “symbolic projections and media tions” (in particula; stereotypes and prejudices linked to divine-human ity or bestial-animality) in the construction of racialized formations. “Racial” classification becomes associated with a distinction between the “properly human” and its imaginary (animal-like) “other.” Such projec tions and mediations, Balibar argues, are inscribed with modernity’s ex pansionist rationality—a quasi-humanist conception that suggests that differences and inequalities are the result of unequal access and social ex clusion from cultural, political, or intellectual life but also implies that these differences and inequalities represent normal patterns, given the level of “humanity” or “animality” attributed to particular populations. James Baldwin in “A Talk to Teachers” (1988) links this phenomenon of racialization to the political economy and its impact on African Ameri cans.The point of all this is that Black men were brought here as a source of cheap labor. They were indispensable to the economy. In order to justify the fact that men were treated as though they were animals, the white re public had to brain wash itself into believing that they were indeed ani mals and deserved to be treated like animals. (7) Lee, Mountain, and Koenig (2001) note, “the taxonomy of race has al ways been and continues to be primarily political” (43). Since politics and economics actually constitute one sphere, it is more precise to say that the ideology of “race” continues to be primarily about political economy. Thus, historians of “race” and racism argue that the idea of immutable, biologically determined “races” is a direct outcome of exploration and colonialism, which furnished the “scientific” justification for the eco nomic exploitation, slavery, and even genocide of those groups perceived as subhuman.

#### \*\* The colonial period wasn’t marked by clear racial hatred – class caused plantation owners terrorized poor whites AND blacks. Slavery was necessary for plantation land expansion and capital acquisition.

Michelle Alexander 2010, associate prof of law, Stanford Law, director of Stanford’s Civil Rights Clinic. Winner of Soros Justice Fellowship, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, p. 23-4, KEL

The concept of race is a relatively recent development. Only in the past few centuries, owing largely to European imperialism, have the world’s people been classified along racial lines.4 Here, in America, the idea of race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery—as well as the extermination of American Indians—with the ideals of freedom preached by whites in the new colonies. In the early colonial period, hen settlements remained relatively small, indentured servitude was the dominant means of securing cheap labor. Under this system, whites and blacks struggled to survive against a common enemy, what historian [crone Bennett Jr. describes as “the big planter apparatus and a social system that legalized terror against black and white bonds men.”3 Initially, blacks brought to this country were not all enslaved: man were treated as indentured servants. As plantation farming expanded, particularly tobacco and cotton farming, demand increased greatly for both labor and land. The demand for land was met by invading and conquering larger and larger swaths of territory. American Indians became a growing impediment to white European “progress,” and during this period, the images of American Indians promoted in books, newspapers, and magazines became increasingly negative. As sociologists Keith Kilty and Eric Swank have observed, eliminating “savages is less of a moral problem than eliminating human beings, and therefore American Indians carne to he understood as a lesser race—uncivilized savages— thus providing a justification For the extermination of the native peoples. The growing demand for labor on plantations was met through slavery. American Indians were considered unsuitable as slaves, largely because native tribes were clearly in a position to fight back. The fear of raids by Indian tribes led plantation owners to grasp for an alternative source of free labor. European immigrants were also deemed poor candidates for slavery, not because of their race, but rather because they were in short supply and enslavement would, quite naturally interfere with voluntary immigration to the new colonies. Plantation owners thus viewed Africans, who were relatively powerless, as the ideal slaves. The systematic enslavement of Africans, and the rearing of their children under bondage, emerged with all deliberate speed—quickened by events such as bacons Rebellion.

#### \*\* Slaves were taken from Africa because they lacked English speaking skills necessary to form class alliances with poor whites

Michelle Alexander 2010, associate prof of law, Stanford Law, director of Stanford’s Civil Rights Clinic. Winner of Soros Justice Fellowship, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, p. 24, KEL

In an effort to protect their superior status and economic position, the planters shifted their strategy for maintaining dominance. They abandoned their heavy reliance on indentured servants in favor of the importation of more black slaves. Instead of importing English-speaking slaves from the West Indies, who were more likely to be familiar with European language and culture, many more slaves were shipped directly from Africa. These slaves would be far easier to control and far less likely to form alliances with poor whites.

#### Modern anti-blackness was born out of class based discrimination

\*\* Claims that the middle passage was the “first” is both historically inaccurate and politically problematic – indentured servitude was the first forced immigration.

Walsh and Jordan 8

White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America

Don Jordan is a television producer and director who has worked on dozens of documentaries and dramas. He also co-produced and co-wrote Love is the Devil, a film about the life of Francis Bacon.

Michael Walsh spent twelve years as a reporter and presenter on World in Action and has won six awards for his work. He is now a producer, specialising in political and historical documentaries.

While the Spanish slaughtered in America for gold, the English in
America had to plant for their wealth. Failing to find the expcctcd
mineral riches along the eastern seaboard, they turned to farming,
hoping to make gold from tobacco. They needed a compliant,
subservient, preferably free labour force and since the indigenous
peoples of America were difficult to enslave they turned to their
own homeland to provide. They imported Britons deemed to be
'surplus' people - the rootless, the unemployed, the criminal and
the dissident - and held them in the Americas in various forms of
bondage for anything from three years to life.

This book tells the story of these victims of empire. They were
all supposed to gain their freedom eventually. For many, it didn't
work out that way. In the early decades, half of them died in
bondage. This book tracks the evolution of the system in which
tens of thousands of whites were held as chattels, marketed like
cattle, punished brutally and in some cases literally worked to death.
For decades, **this underclass was treated just as savagely as black**

**slaves and**, indeed, toiled, **suffered and rebelled alongside them.**
Eventually, a racial wedge was thrust between white and black,
leaving blacks officially enslaved and whites apparently upgraded
but in reality just as enslaved as they were before. According to
contemporaries, some whites were treated with less humanity than
the blacks working alongside them.

#### \*\* Black slavery developed from intro-racial slavery. This doesn’t diminish its importance, but this recognition is crucial to accurate analysis and recognition of the class component of oppression

Walsh and Jordan 8

White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America

Don Jordan is a television producer and director who has worked on dozens of documentaries and dramas. He also co-produced and co-wrote Love is the Devil, a film about the life of Francis Bacon.

Michael Walsh spent twelve years as a reporter and presenter on World in Action and has won six awards for his work. He is now a producer, specialising in political and historical documentaries.

It invites uproar to describe as slaves any of these hapless whites
who were abused, beaten and sometimes killed by their masters or
their masters' overseers. To do so is thought to detract from the
enormity of black suffering after racial slavery developed. **However,
black slavery emerged out of white servitude and was based upon it.**
As the African-American writer Lerone Bennett Jr has observed:

When someone removes the cataracts of whiteness from
our eyes, and when we look with unclouded vision on the
bloody shadows of the American past, we will recognize
for the first time that the Afro-American, who was so often
second in freedom, was also second in slavery.5

Of course, black slavery had hideous aspects that whites did not
experience, but they suffered horrors in common, many of which
were first endured by whites. In crude economic terms, indentured
servants sold their labour for a set period of time; in reality they
sold themselves. They discovered that they were placed under the
power of masters who had more or less total control over their
destiny.

The indentured-servant system evolved into slavery because of
the economic goals of early colonists: it was designed not so much
to help would-be migrants get to America and the Caribbean as
to provide a cheap and compliant workforce for the cash-crop
industry. Once this was established, to keep the workforce in check
it became necessary to create legal sanctions that included violence
and physical restraint. This is what led to slavery: first for whites,
then for blacks.

#### \*\* Plantation owners pitted poor whites against poor blacks with access to land and capital in order to divide the labor force against itself, causing centuries of white privilege and racial conflict

Michelle Alexander 2010, associate prof of law, Stanford Law, director of Stanford’s Civil Rights Clinic. Winner of Soros Justice Fellowship, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, p. 25, KEL

Fearful that such measures might not be sufficient to protect their interests, the planter class took an additional precautionary step, a step that would later come to be known as a “racial bribe.” Deliberately and strategically, the planter class extended special privileges to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge between them and black slaves. White settlers were allowed greater access to Native American lands, white servants were allowed to police slaves through slave patrols and militias, and barriers were created so that free labor would not he placed in competition with slave labor. These measures effectively eliminated the risk of future alliances between black slaves and poor whites. Poor whites suddenly had a direct, personal stake in the existence of a race-based system of slavery. Their own plight had not improved by much, but at least they were not slaves. Once the planter elite split the labor force, poor whites responded to the logic of their situation and sought ways to expand their racially privileged position.

#### Empirically, the use of race as a rallying point divides and conquers the working class and poor

Michelle Alexander 2010, associate prof of law, Stanford Law, director of Stanford’s Civil Rights Clinic. Winner of Soros Justice Fellowship, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, p. 47, KEL

Race had become, yet again, a powerful wedge, breaking up what had been a solid liberal coalition based on economic interests of the poor and the working and lower-middle classes. In the 1968 election, race eclipsed class as the organizing principle of American politics, and by 1972, attitudes on racial issues rather than socioeconomic status were the primary determinant of voters’ political self-identification. The late I 960s and early 1970s marked the dramatic erosion in the belief among working-class whites that the condition of the poor, or those who fail to prosper, was the result of a faulty economic system that needed to be challenged. As the Edsalls explain, “the pitting of whites and blacks at the low end of the income distribution against each other intensified the view among many whites that the condition of life for the disadvantaged—particularly for disadvantaged blacks—is the responsibility of those afflicted, and not the responsibility of the larger society.” Just as race had been used at the turn of the century by Southern elites to rupture class solidarity at die bottom of tile income ladder, race as a national issue bad broken up the Democratic New Deal bottom-up” coalition—a coalition dependent on substantial support from all voters, white and black, at or below the median income.

**A2 perm**

***Permutations are only a reason to vote negative in this debate -- when there is no plan presumption flips neg, which means if they win that doing both is possible it de-justifies the entirety of the 1AC -- you should vote against them for making this argument***

***The struggles of the urban communities they isolate are only conceivable against the backdrop of capitalist globalization this system appeases subgroups in order to calculate and control their existence. We must reassert the dimension of the Universal against capitalist globalization***

**Zizek ’99** (Slavoj, Slovenian Critic, The Ticklish Subject, p. 209-211)

Here however one must fully endorse Badiou’s point that these “returns to the Substance” are themselves impotent in the face of the global march of capital: they are its inherent supplement, the limit/conditioning of its functioning, since - as Deleuze emphasized years ago – capitalist “deterritorialization” is always accompanied by re-emerging re-territorializations. More precisely, there is an inherent split in the field of particular identities themselves caused by the onslaught of capitalist globalization: on the one hand, the so-called ‘fundamentalisms’, whose basic formula is that of the Identity of one’s own group, implying the practice of excluding the threatening Other(s): France for the French (against Algerian immigrants), America for the Americans (against the Hispanic invasion), Slovenia for Slovenians (against the excessive presence of “southerners”, immigrants from the ex-Yugoslav provinces); on the other hand there is post-modern culturalist ‘identity politics’ groups, aiming at the tolerant coexisting of ever-shifting, ‘hybrid’ lifestyle groups, divided into endless subgroups (Hispanic women, black gays, white AIDS patients, lesbian mothers…) This ever flowering of groups and subgroups in their hybrid and fluid, shifting identities, each insisting on the right to assert its specific way of life and/or culture, this incessant diversification, is only possible and thinkable only against the background of capitalist globalization: it is the very way capitalist globalization affects our sense of ethnic and other forms of community belonging: the only link connecting these multiple groups is the link of capital itself, always ready to satisfy the demands of each group and subgroup (gay tourism, Hispanic music...). Furthermore the opposition between fundamentalism and postmodern pluralist identity politics is ultimately a fake, concealing a deeper solidarity (or, to put it in Hegelese, speculative identity): a multiculturalist can easily find even the most fundamentalist ethnic identity attractive, but only so much as it is the identity of the supposedly authentic Other (say, in the USA, Native American tribal unity); a fundamentalist group can easily adopt, in its social functioning, the postmodern strategies of identity politics, presenting itself as one of the threatened minorities, simply striving to maintain its specific way of life and cultural identity. The line of separation between postmodern identity politics and fundamentalism is thus purely formal; it often depends merely on the different prospective from which the observer views the movement for maintaining a group identity. Under these conditions, the event in the guise of a “return to the roots” can only be a semblance that fits the capitalist circular movement perfectly or – in the worst case – leads to a catastrophe like Nazism. The sign of today’s ideologico-political constellation is the fact that these kinds of pseudo-events which seem to pop up (it is only right-wing populism which today displays the authentic political passion of accepting the struggle, of openly admitting that, precisely in so far as one proclaims to speak from a universal standpoint, one does not aim to please everybody, but is ready to introduce a division of “us” versus “them”). It has often been remarked that, despite hating the guts of Buchanan in the USA, Le Pen in France or Haider in Australia, even leftists feel a kind of relief in their appearance – finally, there is someone who revives a proper political passion of division and confrontation, a complete belief in political issues, albeit in a deplorably repulsive form. We are thus more and more deeply locked into a claustrophobic space within which we can only oscillate between the non-event of the smooth running of the liberal-democratic capitalist New World Order and fundamentalist Events (the rise of local proto fascisms, etc) which temporarily disturb the calm surface of the capitalist ocean – no wonder that, in these circumstances, Heidegger mistook the Pseudo-event of the Nazi revolution as the Event itself. Today, more than ever, one has to insist that the only way open to the emergence of an Event is that of globalization-with-particularization by (re)asserting the dimension of Universality against capitalist globalization. Badiou draws an interesting parallel here between our time of American global domination and the late Roman Empire, also a ‘multiculturalist’ global state in which multiple ethnic groups were thriving, united (not by capital, but) by the non-substantial link of the Roman legal order – so what we need today is the gesture that would undermine capitalist globalization from the standpoint of universal Truth, just as Pauline Christianity did to the Roman global empire.

***Whiteness studies cannot fully account for privilege or power relations – they misidentify hierarchy***

Barbara J. **Fields**, Fall 20**01**. “Whiteness, Racism and Identity” International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 60, p 48-56.

In any case, **what may appear to be black/white relations often turn out, when probed, to rest on relations of power and rank among white persons**. Dur ing the early 1920s, Rebecca Garvin, an Afro-American resident of Charleston, South Carolina, used to take her infant grandson for a daily outing around Colo nial Lake in a lavishly adorned baby carriage. Each day a burly Irish policeman would see her and smile, until one day he approached close enough to see that the baby inside was a black boy, not?as the carriage had led him to suppose? a young white son or daughter of the Charleston aristocracy taking a promenade with his black mammy. At once the policeman turned hostile and tried to ban Rebecca Garvin from the area (which, under the law, he could not do). What ever that Irishman's views about Afro-Americans and however they may have figured in his sense of self, his conduct in that instance had primarily to do with his relationship to his white superiors.19 **The concept of whiteness cannot**, therefore, **solve** what I take to be **its central problem** (at least as far as labor history is concerned): **the source of working-class bigotry**, often murderous, against persons of African descent. In deed, **as an organizing concept, whiteness leads to no conclusions that it does not begin with as assumptions**. Whiteness is a racial identity; therefore, white peo ple have a racial identity. **Whiteness equals white supremacy**; therefore, Euro pean immigrants become white by adopting white supremacy. Whiteness entails material benefits; therefore, the material benefits white people receive are a re ward for whiteness. Considering how whiteness scholars scourge others for assuming a built-in tendency toward solidarity among workers, **they display a strikingly romantic vi sion of solidarity as the state of nature for white people. Exclusion from white ness**, they seem to assume, **must account for any breach of solidarity**. If a white man snubs another or calls him a hard name, let alone exploits or disfranchises him, the point at issue is bound to be the victim's racial bona fides. **On the far side of the color line**, it seems, **universal brotherhood and equality prevail**. The wage that supposedly accrues to whiteness typifies the romanticism that besets whiteness scholarship. **Even supposing Afro-Americans' access to re sources reduced to zero, it would not follow that the resources thus freed would be sufficient for all white people to have a share. Nor would the exclusion of Afro-Americans from civic and material goods guarantee Euro-Americans' access to them, as white people of the laboring classes learned to their cost after disfranchisement in the South**.20 (Whether the denial of goods to Afro Americans psychologically compensated white people for their own failure to obtain them is a question best left to those enamored of speculation that evi dence can neither prove nor disprove.) Who receives what is denied to Afro Americans depends on political contest. **The contest might turn on which white people can best take advantage of power over Afro-Americans, or it might have little or nothing to do with Afro-Americans**. For example, the town-dwelling middle class in upstate South Carolina dur ing the 1890s and 1900s sought to curtail lynching by expanding the definition of capital offenses and speeding the process of legal execution. Obviously, solici tude for the victims of lynching had nothing to do with it. The reformers were determined to restore law and order, which is to say rule by the right sort of white people under the right circumstances; their leverage over Afro-Americans in the penal system provided a handy means to that end.21 In contrast, **the denial of Afro-Americans cannot account for the publicly subsidized middle-class enti tlements that became available to white working people in the post-World War Two period. If it did, white people ought to have enjoyed such entitlements from the dawn of the republic**.

#### It is impossible to form coalitions with the 1AC. Their recognition of racism as a singular ideological phenomenon guarantees only those exploited based on skin color will join the movement. Only the alternative can recognize a plural concept of “racism” that can free us from the “White-Black” dichotomy.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

In order to address these structural inequalities, **an analytical shift is required, from “race” to a plural conceptualization of “racisms” and their historical articulations with other ideologies. This plural notion of “racisms” more accurately captures the historically specific nature of racism and the variety of meanings attributed to evaluations of difference and assessments of superiority and inferiority of people. Conversely, to continue our engagement of racism as a singular ideological phenomenon fails to draw on the multiplicity of historical and social processes inherent in the heterogeneity of racialized relations. That is to say, for example, that the notion of “White supremacy” can only have any real meaning within populations whose exploitation and domination is essentialized based on skin color.** As such, **this view severs the experience of African Americans, for instance, from meaningful comparative analysis with those racialized populations whose subordination is predicted on other social characteristics. Consequently, “White supremacy” arguments cannot be employed to analyze, for example, the racialized of Jews in Germany during the 1930s, or Gypsy populations in Eastern Europe, or the Tutsi population in the Congo.** More close to home**, the concept of “White supremacy” sheds little light on what is happening in Watts and South Central Los Angeles between the Korean petite-bourgeoisie and the African American and Latino underclass or reserve army** (to a more traditional concept!). Instead, **what we are arguing for is a plural concept of racism that can free us from the “Black/White” dichotomy and, in its place, assert the historically shifting and politically complex nature of racialization. More specifically, it is a pluralized concept of racism that has relevance and analytical utility in comprehending the political economy of racialized relations in South Central Los Angeles, as well as the larger sociocultural landscape that can, beyond this analysis, link the economic structures of oppression in his local context to the global context of racialized communism.** More importantly, **we argue that the problems of racialized communities are not about “race” but rather about the intricate interplay between a variety of racisms and class. It is for this reason that we do not believe that scholars should not be trying to advance a “critical theory of race.”** A persistence in attributing the idea of “race” with analytical status can only lead us further down a theoretical and political end. **Instead, the task at hand is to deconstruct “race” and detach it from the concept of racism. That is to say, what is essential for activists and social science scholars is to understand that he construction of the idea of “race” is embodied in racist ideology that supports the practice of racism. It is racism as an ideology that produces the notion of “race,” not the existence of “races” that produces racisms.**

#### The affirmatives prioritization of the “White supremacy” struggle homogenizes the objects of racism and can never achieve the status of Universality because it precludes recognition of global exclusion. Only the alternative incorporates all those subjected to the exclusion of capital.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

Moreover, **“White supremacy” arguments analytically essentialize Black/White relations by inferring that the inevitability of skin color ensures the reproduction of racism in the post-colonial world, where White people predominantly associate Black people with inferiority. Inherent in this perspective is the failure to recognize the precolonial origins of racism which were structures within the interior of Europe by the development of nation states and capitalist relations of production. “The dichotomous categories of Blacks as victims, and Whites as perpetrators of racism, tend to homogenize the objects of racism, without paying attention to the different experience of men and women, of different social classes and ethnicities.** As such, **there is little room to link with equal legitimacy, the continuing struggles against racism of Jews, Gypsies, the Irish, immigrant workers, refugees, and other racialized populations of the world** (including African racialized by Africans) **to the struggle of African Americans in the United States.** Hence, **theories of racism that are founded upon the racialized idea of White supremacy adhere rigidly to a “race relations paradigm.” As such, these theories anchor racialized inequality to the alleged “nature” of White people and the psychological influence of White ideology on both Whites and Blacks, rather than to the complex nature of historically constituted social relations of power and their material consequences. In light of this, hook’s preference for White supremacy represents a perspective that, despite its oppositional intent and popularity among many activists and scholars in the field, still fails to critically advance our understanding of the debilitating structures of capitalism and the nature of class formations within a racialized world.** More specifically, **what we argue here is that the struggle against racism and class inequality cannot be founded on either academic or popularized notions of “race” or White supremacy, notions that ultimately reify and “project a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature.” Rather than working to invert racist notions of racialized inferiority, anti-racist scholars and activists should seek to develop a critical theory of racism to confront the fundamental nature and consequences of structural inequalities as reproduced by the historical processes of racialized in U.S. society and around the globe.**

#### The permutation has been tried and failed – combining criticisms of class exploitation with cultural domination regulates class discussion to the background and reproduces neo-liberal ideology.

**McLaren and Farahmandpur 2005** (Peter McLaren, professor of Education at UCLA and Ramin Farahmandpur, assistant professor of education at Portland state, “Teaching Against Global Capitalism,” pgs 53-54, 2005)

**The shift toward a postmodernism layered with a thin veneer of cultural Marxism, scaffolded by identity politics and** postsocialist ideology, **sprayed by aerosol terms such as “difference” and “indeterminancy,”** and dipped in the gurgling foam of Jacuzzi socialism and window-dressing democracy, **has witnessed the categories of cultural domination and oppression replace those of class exploitation and imperialism as capitalism’s reigning antagonisms**. At the same time, **a politics of representation has defly outflanked the issue of socioeconomic redistribution** (Fraser 1997). **The postmodernist and postsocialist assumption that culture has suddenly found ways of winning independence from economic forces and that somehow the new globalized capitalism has decapitated culture from the body of class exploitation by constructing new desires and remaking old ones in ways that are currently unmappable and unfactorable within the theoretical optics of political economy has not only contributed to the crisis of Western Marxism but also effectively secured a long-term monopoly for the capitalist market ideology. Gospelized and accorded a sacerdotal status in the temple of the new postsocialist Left, postmodern theory has failed to provide an effective counterstrategy to the spread of neoliberal ideology that currently holds educational policy and practice in its thrall. In fact, it has provided neoliberalism with the political stability it needs to reproduce its most troublesome determinations.**

#### Any risk of a link shatters the efficacy of the permutation – the alternative alone solves the social subordination they criticize – but incorporating “race” into critical pedagogy stifles coalitions necessary for social justice.

**Darder and Torres, 1999** (Darder, Professor of Education at Claremont and Torres, Professor of public policy at CSU – Long Beach, “Shattering the Race Lens,” Critical Ethnicity, 1999)

**Inherent in these commentaries is the inability to conceive how the denial of “race” does not imply the denial of the racialization of populations and the racist ideologies that have been central to capitalist exploitation and domination around the globe. Yet, it is precisely the failure to grasp this significant analytical concept that ultimately stifles the development of a critical theory of racism, a theory with the analytical depth to free us from a paradigm that explains social subordination** (or domination) within the alleged nature of particular populations. **It cannot be left unsaid that often uncritical responses to eliminating the concept of “race” are associated with a fear of delegitimizing the historical movements for liberation that have been principally defined in terms of “race” struggles or progressive institutional interventions that have focused on “race” numbers to evaluate success.** Although understandable, **such responses nevertheless demonstrate the tenacious and adhesive quality of socially constructed ideas and how through their historical usage these ideas become common sense notions that resist deconstruction.** The dilemma that ensues for scholars and activists in the field is well-articulated by Angela Davis: “’Race’ has always been difficult to talk about in terms not tainted by ideologies of racism, with which the notion of “race” shares a common historical evolution. The assumption that a taxonomy of human populations can be constructed based on phenotypic characteristics has been discredited. Yet, we continue to use the term “race,” even though many of us are very careful to set it off in quotation marks to indicate that while we do not take seriously the notion of “race” as biologically grounded, neither are we able to think about racist power structures and marginalization processes without invoking the socially constructed concept of “race.”” As a consequence, **“race” is retained as “an analytical category not because it corresponds to any biological or epistemological absolutes, but because of the power that collective identities acquire by means of their roots in tradition. This tradition that oftentimes has functioned to obstruct the development of political alliances necessary to the establishment of social movements for human rights, social justice, and economic democracy.**

#### The alternative is mutually exclusive with the plan – critique must be absolute

**Mészáros, ’11** (István, Professor Emeritus – University of Sussex, “The Only Viable Economy”, 6-17, http://monthlyreview.org/2007/04/01/the-only-viable-economy)

The incompatibilities of the two systems become amply clear when we consider their relationship to the question of limit itself. The only sustainable growth positively promoted under the alternative social metabolic control is based on the conscious acceptance of the limits whose violation would imperil the realization of the chosen—and humanly valid—reproductive objectives. Hence wastefulness and destructiveness (as clearly identified limiting concepts) are absolutely excluded by the consciously accepted systemic determinations themselves, adopted by the social individuals as their vital orienting principles. By contrast, the capital system is characterized, and fatefully driven, by the—conscious or unconscious—rejection of all limits, including its own systemic limits. Even the latter are arbitrarily and dangerously treated as if they were nothing more than always superable contingent obstacles. Hence anything goes in this social reproductive system, including the possibility—and by the time we have reached our own historical epoch also the overwhelming grave probability—of total destruction. Naturally, this mutually exclusive relationship to the question of limits prevails also the other way round. Thus, there can be **no “partial correctives” borrowed** from the capital system when creating and strengthening the alternative social metabolic order. The partial—not to mention general—incompatibilities of the two systems arise from the radical **incompatibility** of their value dimension. As mentioned above, this is why the particular value determinations and relations of the alternative order could not be transferred into capital’s social metabolic framework for the purpose of improving it, as postulated by some utterly unreal reformist design, wedded to the vacuous methodology of “little by little.” For even the smallest partial relations of the alternative system are deeply embedded in the general value determinations of an overall framework of human needs whose inviolable elementary axiom is the radical exclusion of waste and destruction, in accord with its innermost nature.